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RESUMO 
 
Este trabalho tem como objetivo analisar o desenvolvimento de instituições criadas para o combate 
ao terrorismo por meio do desempenho de atividades de inteligência nacional nos Estados Unidos 
e na França, buscando elucidar as principais diferenças e similaridades entre os dois processos 
distintos. O artigo expõe as contribuições da teoria do neoinstitucionalismo histórico da ciência 
política, permitindo a compreensão do fenômeno da institucionalização. Uma abordagem 
comparativa dos casos, estudados de maneira detalhada, é apresentada, destacando as principais 
ocorrências que guiaram os atuais desenhos institucionais e estratégias de combate ao terrorismo 
estadunidense e francesa. Ao seu fim, conclusões são feitas a respeito de aparentes lógicas de 
centralização e normalização que permearam a reforma da Comunidade de Inteligência dos 
Estados Unidos (USIC) e da Comunidade Francesa de Inteligência (CFR) no contexto da Guerra 
Global ao Terror.  
 
Palavras-chave: Instituições; Contraterrorismo; Inteligência; Estados Unidos; França.   
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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper has the objective of analyzing the development of institutions designed to combat 
terrorism by means of national intelligence activities in the United States and France, aiming at 
elucidating the main differences and similarities between these two distinctive processes. The 
article exposes the contributions of the historical neo-institutionalist theory of political science, 
allowing the comprehension of the institutionalization phenomenon. A comparative approach of 
the cases, studied in a detailed manner, is presented, highlighting the main occurrences that led to 
the formulation of the North-American and French current institutional designs and strategies for 
countering terrorism. By its end, conclusions are drawn in regards to the perceived rationales of 
centralization and normalization that permeated the reform of the United States Intelligence 
Community (USIC) and the creation of the Communauté Française du Renseignement (CFR) in 
the context of the Global War on Terror.  
 
Keywords: Institutions; Counterterrorism; Intelligence; United States; France. 
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ATENÇÃO: 
 
Este trabalho foi estruturado de acordo com as Resoluções nº 114/2014 e 115/2014 da Câmara de 
Pós-Graduação da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. Conforme a resolução 115/2014: 
“a Tese, Dissertação ou Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso deverá conter, além do(s) artigo(s), os 
elementos identificatórios normatizados pelo Sistema de Bibliotecas da UFRGS, Introdução ao 
tema ou problema, contendo descrição geral dos objetivos e uma ampla revisão bibliográfica, bem 
como Considerações Finais, contendo síntese dos resultados gerais que serviram de base para as 
conclusões, e mais Referências Bibliográficas pertinentes à Introdução e ao capítulo final, além 
dos Anexos”. 
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O terrorismo é considerado um dos principais desafios a ser enfrentado por muitos países 
ao redor do mundo e sua tipificação é necessária para a construção de mecanismos eficazes para 
combatê-lo. Entretanto, não existe um conceito único que melhor o descreva, sem a persistência 
de divergências significativas dentro da comunidade internacional (BRANT; LASMAR, 2004). 
Alguns elementos parecem claros e livres de controvérsias: a utilização da violência física ou 
psicológica, a instrumentalização do medo como arma de convencimento, os fins políticos de um 
ataque, entre outros (MOGHADAM, 2006; MARAS, 2014). Porém, dezenas de propostas recentes 
de definições universais providenciaram elementos que dão margens a interpretações ambíguas do 
fenômeno e, por conseguinte, manipulações políticas1. Segundo Maras (2014, p.4), se o conceito 
de terrorismo não for suficientemente limitado para diferenciá-lo de outras formas de violência, 
este pode ser construído de forma a significar virtualmente qualquer coisa. 
Adiciona-se à dificuldade de definição de terrorismo o fato de este não ser um fenômeno 
verdadeiramente recente ou imutável – apesar de elencado como parte das “novas ameaças” do 
século XXI pelo Ocidente (CEPIK; ARTURI, 2011). O termo “terrorismo” tem suas origens no 
final do século XVIII, durante a Revolução Francesa. Neste período, os jacobinos, sob a liderança 
de Robespierre, decretaram na França o “Reino do Terror”, no qual o governo provisório 
abertamente perseguiu todos aqueles por ele considerados “inimigos da Revolução” e condenou-
os a execuções públicas por guilhotina. Ao transformar as execuções de seus alvos em violentos 
espetáculos públicos, o Comitê de Segurança Pública de Robespierre utilizou o medo como uma 
arma de controle e disciplina frente à população; técnica esta que seria explorada por grupos não-
estatais e desfavorecidos no futuro (GUPTA, 2006). 
Segundo Rapoport (apud GUPTA, 2006), o que atualmente consideramos como 
“terrorismo moderno” tem sua evolução marcada por diferentes “ondas”. São consideradas ondas 
os conjuntos de incidentes terroristas nos últimos séculos, que podem ser agrupados tanto por suas 
ideologias e motivações, quanto por seus métodos de emprego da violência. A Primeira Onda se 
deu no final do século XIX. Grupos inspirados nos ideais anarquistas e niilistas de Bakunim e 
Nachayev conduziram uma série de ataques com armas de fogo ou explosivos na Rússia e na 
                                                 
1 Dentro de seu compreensivo estudo, Schmid (2011) compilou mais de cem diferentes definições do conceito de 
terrorismo ao redor do mundo, buscando denominadores comuns entre elas. Em sua conclusão, ao constatar a ausência 
de consenso sobre termo a nível global, o autor atesta a existência de um sério problema, na medida em que esta 
situação impediria a cooperação efetiva contra o terrorismo. 
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Europa Oriental, advogando por reformas políticas ou pela instauração do comunismo ou do 
anarquismo ao assassinar governantes ou membros de famílias reais. 
A Segunda Onda ocorreu com o final da Segunda Guerra Mundial e o declínio dos grandes 
impérios coloniais. Com suas metrópoles enfraquecidas, territórios dependentes de elites políticas 
estrangeiras foram palco de movimentos contestatórios de cunho nacionalista. Entidades de 
controle colonial foram alvo de sucessivos ataques terroristas nesta época, demonstrando a 
insatisfação de grupos locais com a presença estrangeira em suas terras (MARAS, 2014). A 
Terceira Onda teve início na década de 1960 com a crescente revolta de grupos de esquerda em 
relação às injustiças do sistema capitalista e de sua opressão ao proletariado. Ela ganhou força com 
a divulgação midiática dos horrores cometidos na Guerra do Vietnã, compelindo grupos 
extremistas a buscarem a Revolução do povo trabalhador por meio da violência (GUPTA, 2006). 
Com a crescente interconectividade do mundo globalizado, esta foi a onda mais 
“internacionalizada” até o momento, com escalas globais de planejamento, treinamento e execução 
de ataques (BRANT; LASMAR, 2004). 
A Quarta Onda, pela qual passamos hoje, tem em seu cerne o extremismo religioso. Dois 
foram os acontecimentos que impulsionaram esta onda: a Revolução Iraniana de 1979 e a expulsão 
dos soviéticos do Afeganistão pelos mujahideens na década de 1980. Em ambos os eventos, forças 
islâmicas de valores tradicionais e radicais foram capazes de derrotar forças seculares que 
ameaçavam seu modo de vida e, acima de tudo, sua religião. Mesmo com o apoio do Ocidente no 
caso dos mujahideens, os vitoriosos destes conflitos radicalizaram-se em grupos antagônicos a 
qualquer expressão do modo de vida ocidental, tornando este embate em um conflito espiritual e 
individual contra forças teoricamente contrárias ao Islã (WEINBERG; EUBANK, 2006). 
Com o passar do tempo, o terrorismo passou a ser empregado como a arma dos fracos, dos 
oprimidos e dos explorados pelo sistema capitalista controlado pelo Ocidente e por seus aliados. 
Ele é uma estratégia intermediária no espectro de violência: não é tão letal – ou custosa – quanto 
uma campanha militar, mas é mais destrutiva que demonstrações pacíficas de insatisfação, como 
greves e protestos (MARAS, 2014, p. 13). Haberfeld (2009, p. 1-2) afirma que terroristas são 
minorias que não possuem ou afirmam não possuir o que a maioria possui ou afirma possuir. Ele 
resume o terrorismo como a busca da minoria por aquilo que a maioria possui e a minoria não2, 
                                                 
2 Aqui, o autor se refere à minoria não-detentora como os “Have Nots” e à maioria detentora como os “Haves”. 
17 
 
utilizando o medo como arma. Destarte, o terrorismo consolida-se pouco a pouco como meio de 
contestação dos “menos favorecidos” frente a presentes estruturas de poder ao redor do globo. 
Os ataques de 11 de setembro de 2001 em solo estadunidense foram o principal marco da 
Quarta Onda. O sucesso de grupos extremistas como a al-Qaeda consolidou com sucesso a agenda 
de combate à “nova” ameaça constituída pelo terrorismo moderno. Este impasse demonstrou como 
governos não entendiam suficientemente a natureza deste fenômeno e, por conseguinte, não 
portavam mecanismos para conter seu avanço. Paradoxalmente, em paralelo à irrestrita 
condenação aos ataques, a comunidade internacional permanecia incapaz de atingir um consenso 
em relação à definição do ato de violência política constituído pelo terrorismo. Se por um lado a 
não compreensão de um fenômeno já representava um entrave para a resolução de um problema, 
as próprias indefinições conceituais sobre terrorismo impediam que qualquer medida contrária ao 
terrorismo fosse tomada de forma imediata por parte de entidades governamentais. De acordo com 
Brant e Lasmar (2004): 
 
Tem-se aqui espelhada, por um lado, toda a amplitude das consequências geradas pela dificuldade 
de acordo convencional e universal na definição do fenômeno terrorista e por outro, o desejo da 
comunidade internacional em rever e reformular os instrumentos e institutos jurídicos de combate e 
repressão ao terrorismo frente ao sentimento geral de que os mecanismos até então vigentes são 
incapazes de fornecer uma resposta eficaz e segura contra este flagelo (p. 186). 
 
Como centros do mundo ocidental, os Estados Unidos e a França foram palco de uma série 
de ataques – e tentativas de ataques – terroristas da Quarta Onda desde os acontecimentos de 2001. 
Os governos de George W. Bush (2001-2008) e Barack Obama (2009-2016) nos Estados Unidos 
e de Jacques Chirac (1995-2007), Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012) e François Hollande (2012-2017) 
na França foram responsáveis pela complexa tarefa de criar e reformular instituições que seriam 
designadas especificamente para a manutenção da segurança nacional frente às novas percepções 
de ameaça do mundo globalizado pós-2001 – função esta que foi herdada aos recentemente eleitos 
governos de Donald Trump e Emmanuel Macron. 
A partir destas considerações, o objetivo do presente trabalho é o de analisar o processo de 
institucionalização das políticas públicas de combate ao terrorismo pelos sistemas nacionais de 
inteligência dos Estados Unidos e da França. Neste trabalho, são estudadas as medidas adotadas 
por estes dois países que se seguiram à declaração da Guerra Global ao Terror, feita pelo presidente 
George W. Bush em 2011, que se mantém até a data da publicação deste trabalho. À luz da 
abordagem histórica do neoinstitucionalismo, procura-se elucidar as características distintas dos 
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dois casos selecionados, que resultaram em diferentes estratégias de contraterrorismo para cada 
país. Por conseguinte, a consulta a documentos oficiais e a bibliografias especializadas foi 
essencial para o esforço descritivo aqui proposto. 
Os objetos desta pesquisa são as instituições de segurança e defesa dos Estados Unidos e 
da França ou, mais especificamente, as agências e órgãos que compõem os sistemas nacionais de 
inteligência destes dois países. Mais especificamente, analisam-se ações governamentais – 
traduzidas em políticas públicas de segurança e defesa – que visam a integridade territorial e 
populacional de um Estado e, subsequentemente, sofrem um processo de institucionalização dentro 
de um sistema político. 
No campo da Ciência Política, não há consenso a respeito de instituições políticas; nem 
quanto ao seu conceito, nem quanto à sua centralidade na política. Ciente disso, convenciona-se 
para os fins desta pesquisa que as instituições são variáveis explicativas e fundamentais do 
fenômeno analisado, qual seja o combate ao terrorismo nos Estados Unidos e na França. Tal 
escolha referencial vai ao encontro do pensamento neoinstitucionalista do campo. O 
neoinstitucionalismo, surgido como um movimento contestatório ao comportamentalismo nas 
Ciências Sociais, reafirma que o comportamento dos agentes políticos pode ser explicado mediante 
a compreensão do funcionamento de instituições políticas, sejam elas leis, procedimentos, 
convenções, regras processuais, estruturas organizacionais entre outros (PERES, 2008).  
Longe de constituir um corpo de pensamento uniforme na Ciência Política, todavia, o 
neoinstitucionalismo possui diferentes abordagens a respeito da natureza destas mesmas 
instituições. Dentre elas está o neoinstitucionalismo histórico. De acordo com Sanders (2006), esta 
abordagem pressupõe que interações políticas são melhor compreendidas quando analisadas em 
contextos marcados por estruturas de regras, que são, elas mesmas, criações humanas. Ainda 
segundo a autora, há a relevância do aspecto temporal nestas análises. Instituições não são vistas 
por uma perspectiva estática, mas sim como parte de um processo histórico. A criação e as 
mudanças institucionais possuem uma “dependência de trajetória3”, ou seja, estão condicionadas 
a decisões e processos localizados no passado. 
Da lógica da dependência de trajetória, conclui-se concomitantemente que nem todas as 
instituições são resultado de decisões plenamente racionais ou conscientes. O condicionamento a 
decisões passadas implica que há constrangimentos ao cálculo racional dos atores políticos 
                                                 
3 Da expressão em inglês, path dependency. 
19 
 
envolvidos em processos institucionais. Existe um contexto no qual estes atores estão inseridos, 
moldando percepções e interpretações da realidade que os cerca. Por conseguinte, são por vezes 
notados “resultados perversos” advindos da criação ou modificação de uma instituição. Assim, 
nota-se que instituições políticas podem produzir os resultados diferentes daqueles incialmente 
almejados por seus criadores. Além disso, mas não menos importante, as instituições garantem sua 
própria existência a partir do momento que são criadas, uma vez que elas formatam percepções e 
interpretações de atores políticos a respeito delas mesmas. 
Há ainda a noção que o Estado não é neutro. O neoinstitucionalismo histórico assume que 
as instituições distribuem o poder de forma desigual a diferentes grupos sociais, resultando em 
assimetrias marcantes. Com influência neomarxista e estrutural-funcionalista, o jogo político é 
visto como um processo no qual há ganhadores e perdedores, no qual grupos articulam-se em prol 
de ideias (SANDERS, 2006). Determinados grupos e seus respectivos interesses, por conseguinte, 
teriam diferentes níveis de acesso à esfera de tomada de decisão de um governo (HALL; TAYLOR, 
1996; TRUE et al., 2007). Assim, a depender da posição que um ator ocupa dentro de um sistema 
político desigual, este será constrangido ou incentivado por instituições, tornando-o incapaz ou 
capaz de gerar mudanças institucionais subsequentes. Instituições, portanto, são o reflexo da 
distribuição de poder de um sistema. 
Por conseguinte, afirma-se que o processo de institucionalização4 é pautado por todas estas 
nuances. Na institucionalização, uma ação governamental é, em determinado espaço de tempo, 
consolidada na forma de uma instituição formal ou informal. Trata-se de um processo inserido em 
um contexto histórico específico e, portanto, constrangido por uma trajetória. É um processo que, 
pelas limitações a ele impostas, pode ter consequências imprevistas. Ele ocorre dentro de sistemas 
desiguais, nos quais, de acordo com hierarquias vigentes, apenas alguns atores são capazes de 
influenciá-lo. Ele pode ainda acabar por reproduzir estes mesmos sistemas de desigualdade e, 
adicionalmente, garantir sua a sobrevivência ou persistência de instituições em um sistema político 
ao moldar percepções e interpretações de atores políticos ao seu fim. 
Dito isso, cabe ressaltar que, para além das questões de provimento de serviços básicos do 
Estado de bem-estar, como a saúde e a educação, por exemplo, políticas públicas são também 
                                                 
4 Entende-se que o conceito de institucionalização aqui utilizado extrapola a definição inicialmente formulada por 
Huntington (1975, p. 12) para a consolidação de partidos políticos, na qual a institucionalização seria um processo em 
que organizações adquirem valor e estabilidade.   
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direcionadas a aspectos não diretamente relacionados aos esforços de inclusão social da atividade 
governamental, como é o caso das políticas públicas de segurança e defesa. Neste sentido, mesmo 
que ocupe menos espaço na literatura especializada, a atividade de inteligência constitui também 
uma política pública, uma vez que, conforme a definição de Souza (2007), ela seria uma ação 
governamental que, através de sua institucionalização, busca uma mudança específica – nesse 
caso, a garantia de integridade física populacional e territorial frente a ameaças externas e internas. 
Mais especificamente, as políticas de prevenção e combate ao terrorismo a partir da atividade de 
inteligência são desempenhadas pela mobilização do aparato estatal para a neutralização de um 
risco securitário pré-definido, constituindo, assim, uma política pública de segurança e defesa. 
 Para os fins deste projeto, destaca-se que Johnson (2007, p. 1-4) elucida quatro diferentes 
perspectivas do conceito de inteligência governamental nos Estudos de Inteligência. A primeira 
delas, mais comumente empregada, vê inteligência como “informação”. Ela pode ser definida aqui 
como as capacidades e intenções de um adversário em particular, obtidas e analisadas através de 
meios clandestinos ou abertos. Na segunda definição, inteligência é vista como um “processo”. 
Nela, a inteligência seria um conceito mais amplo: um produto final, resultante do chamado “ciclo 
de inteligência”. No ciclo, a partir do planejamento inicial, informações acerca de um alvo 
específico são coletadas para serem então propriamente processadas e analisadas por uma equipe 
de profissionais. Após passar por esta transformação, a informação, em forma de produto final de 
inteligência, é disseminada aos consumidores de inteligência, dando espaço para o recomeço do 
ciclo a partir de um novo planejamento.  
Em uma terceira perspectiva, o conceito de inteligência se aplica às “missões” 
desempenhadas por esta. Estas missões são primariamente as já descritas atividades de coleta e 
análise de informação, mas também incluem as missões relacionadas a áreas estratégicas: a 
contrainteligência, o contraterrorismo e a contraproliferação. O conceito de inteligência abrange 
também, portanto, os esforços da inteligência nacional para frustrar operações secretas de serviços 
de inteligência estrangeiros e organizações terroristas hostis à segurança nacional. É ainda 
abarcada nesta perspectiva as missões de operações encobertas – operações secretas de influência 
ou intervenção. Por fim, em uma quarta e última definição, a inteligência é vista como o “conjunto 
de pessoas e organizações” que desempenham as missões descritas acima.  
Sobre a missão de contraterrorismo desempenhada a partir da atividade de inteligência, 
tais políticas estatais de combate ao terrorismo dizem respeito às tarefas incumbidas a estes 
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sistemas nacionais de inteligência para combater e dissuadir a ameaça constituída por grupos ou 
indivíduos associados a organizações terroristas. De acordo com Ganor (2005, p. 25-26), a missão 
de políticas nacionais de contraterrorismo é ampla, podendo agir sob diferentes níveis com três 
principais objetivos, em ordem decrescente de escopo e linhas gerais: eliminar o terrorismo, 
minimizar os danos causados por este e prevenir o seu agravamento. Para este autor, eliminar o 
terrorismo envolveria esforços para a erradicação do inimigo, a remoção de seus incentivos para a 
condução de ataques ou a resolução da questão pela qual os terroristas lutam. Por sua vez, a 
minimização de danos envolveria a prevenção de certos tipos de ataques (armas não-
convencionais, ataques suicidas, etc.) ou a redução da ocorrência destes mesmos. Já a prevenção 
de agravamento propõe-se impedir que o escopo dos ataques aumente ou que o conflito se espalhe.  
Tendo em vista a complexidade dos objetivos supracitados, os sistemas nacionais de 
inteligência, por sua vez, podem auxiliar esta missão ao:  
 
Identificar aqueles engajados no terrorismo em todos os seus níveis de envolvimento e revelar seus 
esconderijos e fontes de recrutamento; rastrear seus armamentos, fontes de suprimento e métodos 
de financiamento de terrorismo; avisar sobre ataques futuros e, assim, preveni-los; administrar 
situações de crise ao transmitir informações que tomadores de decisão requerem; providenciar 
informações necessárias para desempenhar ações de contraterrorismo; perturbar redes de 
comunicação de organizações terroristas; e mais (ROBERTSON apud GANOR, 2005, p. 47)5. 
Desta maneira, torna-se evidente que a atividade de inteligência pode fazer-se presente nas 
diferentes dimensões de esforços contrários ao terrorismo. Seja como grande facilitadora da 
formulação de políticas a nível estratégico ou como diminuidora de incertezas a níveis tático e 
operacional, a inteligência é capaz de desmistificar a percepção do terrorismo como ameaça 
imbatível, por seu caráter transnacional e mutável. Por conseguinte, uma “missão nacional de 
contraterrorismo” enquanto política pública pode abarcar uma amplitude considerável de 
iniciativas – estratégicas, táticas ou operacionais – que podem ser tomadas pelo sistema nacional 
de inteligência de modo a combater ameaças terroristas, requerendo um complexo arcabouço 
institucional para ser desempenhada6. 
                                                 
5 No original: Identify those engaged in terrorism at all levels of involvement and reveal their safe havens and sources 
of recruitment; track down their weapons, channels of supply, and methods for funding terrorism; warn against future 
attacks and, thus, prevent them; manage crisis situations by transmitting the information decision makers require; 
provide information necessary to carry out counterterrorism actions; disrupt terrorist organizations’ communications 
networks; and more.   
6 É necessário ressaltar, todavia, que nada disto ocorre sem altos custos às liberdades individuais de determinadas 
populações, mesmo nas consolidadas “democracias liberais” do Ocidente. Conforme desenvolvido por Bigo e Walker 
(2008, p. 3): “[…] pour être efficace, le contre-terrorisme devrait pouvoir extraire de l’information de n’importe où 
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 A Guerra ao Terror buscou tornar a luta contra o terrorismo um empreendimento global e 
único. Conforme declarado por George W. Bush para o Congresso estadunidense no dia 20 de 
setembro de 2001, os Estados Unidos utilizariam todos os recursos em seu comando – militares, 
diplomáticos, de inteligência, financeiros e legais – para derrotar a al-Qaeda e todas as formas de 
terrorismo dentro e fora de seu território. Afirmando que não somente a liberdade estadunidense 
estava em risco e que esta não era uma guerra somente dos Estados Unidos, mas sim da 
“civilização” que acredita no progresso, na pluralidade, na tolerância e na liberdade, Bush 
convidou todas as nações do planeta para juntarem-se a este empreendimento. O ex-presidente 
ainda reforçou o tom internacional e conjunto da Guerra ao Terror ao invocar a Carta da 
Organização do Tratado do Atlântico-Norte (OTAN) que considera um ataque a um de seus 
Estados-membro como um ataque a todos os membros da organização (BUSH, 2001). 
 Justifica-se a escolha do caso estadunidense baseado no protagonismo deste país em 
relação ao esforço global contra o terrorismo. Desde 2001, os Estados Unidos envolveram-se em 
uma série de conflitos internacionais com o objetivo declarado de destruir supostas fontes de apoio 
a redes transnacionais de terrorismo. Foram os casos das invasões ao Afeganistão e à Líbia e 
também dos ataques aéreos no Paquistão, no Iêmen, na Somália, no Iraque e na Síria. Neste 
ínterim, o governo estadunidense tratou de tentar reformular seu sistema nacional de inteligência 
frente às falhas que permitiram os ataques à Nova York e Washington – bem como a invasão ao 
Iraque sob falsas premissas (ZEGART, 2007; ALLEN, 2013). Como resultado, a aparato 
securitário do país passou por reformas significativas que visaram protegê-lo, principalmente, 
contra as ameaças impostas pela al-Qaeda, em um primeiro momento, e contra o autodeclarado 
Estado Islâmico do Iraque e da Síria (ISIS), posteriormente. 
 As reformas do sistema de inteligência estadunidense em relação à sua missão nacional de 
contraterrorismo deram-se mediante iniciativas de reorganização e centralização desta atividade, 
empreendidas após o 11 de setembro7, aliadas à aprovação de medidas de caráter emergencial 
                                                 
et sur n’importe qui. Il ne pourrait fonctionner s’il était bloqué par les souverainetés des États et par les mécanismes 
juridiques et judiciaires habituels de protection de liberté. » Por mais que o Estado de exceção permitido pela luta 
global contra o terrorismo seja pertinente para o campo da Ciência Política, e que o delicado tradeoff entre segurança 
e eficácia de sistemas nacionais de inteligência seja um desafio constante à democracia moderna (MATEI; 
BRUNEAU, 2011, p. 601), estas não serão as temáticas principais deste trabalho. 
7 Sublinha-se aqui que nenhuma inciativa significativa e abrangente relacionada ao combate ao terrorismo pela 
atividade de inteligência havia sido tomada pelo governo estadunidense antes dos atentados de 2001. Excetua-se, neste 
caso, o estabelecimento do Counterterrorism Center (CTC), no âmbito da Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), em 
1986. Este centro, todavia, tinha suas atividades largamente circunscritas ao âmbito desta agência, não podendo ser 
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contra o terror, como o Patriot Act. Resultado de um longo processo de formulação e 
implementação de mudanças institucionais – conforme objetiva-se explicitar na presente pesquisa 
–, estas iniciativas compreendiam a necessidade de unificação do esforço de combate ao terrorismo 
dentro do aparelho securitário dos Estados Unidos. Compreendiam ademais que, até então, a 
ameaça terrorista era combatida de maneira pulverizada e pouco desenvolvida pela comunidade 
de inteligência, abrindo espaço para graves erros estratégicos de análise e ação subsequente 
(ZEGART, 2007; ESTADOS UNIDOS, 2011; ALLEN, 2013) 
Assim, instituições nacionais foram criadas e moldadas com estes fins específicos, 
modificando, dentro dos diversos limites impostos ao processo de tomada de decisão, a estrutura 
institucional de parte do sistema nacional de inteligência voltado para esta missão. Destaca-se, 
nesse sentido a criação do cargo de Director of National Intelligence (DNI), uma posição dentro 
da comunidade de inteligência dos EUA atribuída para o exercício de funções de administração e 
coordenação das agências e componentes desta mesma. Para o fim específico do contraterrorismo, 
sublinha-se a criação da divisão de Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) no 
âmbito do Department of Homeland Security (DHS) em 2002, do Terrorist Threat Integration 
Center (TTIC) também em 2002, sob a autoridade do Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)8, do 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) em 2004, desta vez sob a supervisão do DNI. 
 Soma-se a este trabalho a descrição do caso francês. Também Estado-membro da OTAN, 
a França providenciou apoio significativo a todas as missões internacionais lideradas por 
Washington no Oriente Médio. Ainda esteve por conta própria envolvida em missões declaradas 
como antiterroristas nos territórios de suas ex-colônias do continente africano, como recentemente 
no Mali (LEQUESNE, 2016). Não obstante, o sistema de inteligência francês também passou por 
uma série de reformas buscando melhor adaptá-lo às novas percepções de ameaça e necessidades 
securitárias da República Francesa (FRANÇA, 2014), ao mesmo tempo que o país vem sendo alvo 
de uma série de atentados terroristas que resultaram em centenas de assassinatos, com destaque 
para os ataques em Paris à sede do jornal satírico Charlie Hebdo em janeiro de 2015, os ataques 
também em Paris à casa de shows Bataclan e ao arredores do Stade de France em novembro de 
2015, e o incidente do Dia da Bastilha em Nice em 2016. 
                                                 
considerado como parte de uma grande mudança de postura de Washington em relação à ameaça representado pelo 
terrorismo global. 
8 Cargo anterior à criação da posição de DNI. O DCI também era nominalmente o “chefe” da inteligência dos EUA, 
ao mesmo tempo que dirigia a CIA, porém possuía menos atribuições e competências que sua versão posterior. 
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 No caso da França, as reformas empreendidas pela República assumiram um matiz 
diferente do caso estadunidense. Mesmo com o choque representado pelo início da Quarta Onda 
do terrorismo, o sistema nacional de inteligência francês permaneceu largamente intocado nos 
primeiros anos do século XXI, sendo herdeiro de um sistema já estabelecido anos antes 
(GREGORY, 2003). Baseado principalmente na lei nº 86-1020 de 9 de setembro de 1986 – e na 
expansão desta mesma em 1995 e 1996 – o combate ao terrorismo na França por meio da atividade 
de inteligência foi marcado por um fenômeno de judicialização desta mesma. Em outras palavras, 
desde a implementação desta lei ao final do século XX, a missão de contraterrorismo da 
inteligência francesa esteve fortemente aliada ao sistema judiciário do país (BONELLI, 2008), 
confundindo, por vezes, o exercício desta atividade tradicionalmente burocrática nos Estados 
Unidos, por exemplo, com a atividade jurídica e policial9.  
 Com efeito, desde os ataques de 2001 em solo estadunidense, tanto os presidentes quanto 
primeiros-ministros franceses levaram adiante reformas de caráter centralizador e normalizador da 
atividade de inteligência10, refletindo o que ocorria com a inteligência da esfera anglo-saxônica. 
Em 2008, com a publicação do Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional durante o governo Sarkozy, há 
a primeira menção oficial de uma “comunidade de inteligência” na França. Neste mesmo ano é 
criado o cargo de coordenador nacional de inteligência de posição análoga ao cargo ocupado pelo 
DNI nos Estados Unidos (HAYEZ, 2010), agindo no também estabelecido Conseil National du 
Renseignement (CNR), formação especializada do Conseil de Défense et de Sécurité Nationale 
(CDSN). O Livro Branco ainda consolidou a fusão entre duas agências de inteligência doméstica: 
a Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) e a Direction Centrale des Renseignements 
Généraux (DCRG) formaram a Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur (DCRI), 
renomeada Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure (DGSI) em 2012 (FRANÇA, 2014). 
 A pesquisa é realizada na forma de um estudo comparado entre dois casos detalhados, 
almejando a elaboração de variáveis operacionalizáveis para ambos para este fim. Assim, busca-
se aqui, como o primeiro passo de um esforço científico mais abrangente, a exploração detalhada 
                                                 
9 Argumenta-se que tal singularidade se deva à capacitação de magistrados franceses para o desempenho de coleta e 
análise de informações que foi concedida pela lei de 1986 (SHAPIRO; SUZAN, 2003; HELMUTH, 2015), ao mesmo 
tempo que, complementarmente, os serviços já estabelecidos de inteligência doméstica e estrangeira continuaram a 
exercer suas atividades em estreita cooperação com forças policiais (BONELLI, 2008). 
10 Em relação à centralização da missão nacional de contraterrorismo, a França já possuía desde 1984 um “centro de 
fusão” responsável pela coordenação e integração analítica interagência para este propósito: a Unité de Coordination 
de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste (UCLAT). 
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a respeito do fenômeno elencado nestes dois países, a partir de análises qualitativas de documentos 
oficiais e bibliografias especializadas, para a tentativa subsequente de desempenhar a sua análise 
comparada nas porções conclusivas deste trabalho. 
 Com esta contextualização, foi almejada a exposição do objetivo, da temática, dos 
referenciais teóricos e conceituais, das delimitações espaciais e temporais, e da metodologia do 
artigo a seguir. 
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COUNTERTERRORISM INSTITUTIONALIZATION:  
The cases of American and French Intelligence 
 
Victor Merola 
 
This article has the objective of analyzing the development of institutions designed to combat 
terrorism by means of national intelligence activities in the United States and France, aiming at 
elucidating the main differences and similarities between these two distinctive processes. This goal 
is enabled by exposing the contributions of the historical neo-institutionalist theory of political 
science, allowing the comprehension of the institutionalization phenomenon. Case studies of both 
countries are presented, highlighting the main occurrences that led to the formulation of the North-
American and French current institutional designs and strategies for countering terrorism. By its 
end, conclusions are drawn in regards to the perceived rationales of centralization and 
normalization that permeated the reform of the United States Intelligence Community (USIC) and 
the creation of the Communauté Française du Renseignement (CFR) in the context of the Global 
War on Terror. 
 
Keywords: Institutions; Counterterrorism; Intelligence; United States; France. 
 
Introduction 
By the beginning of the twentieth-first century, the threat posed by terrorism assumed the 
epicenter of national and international security debates. States struggle to understand the nature of 
terrorism, resulting from the intricate, changing dynamics of the international system following 
the end of the Cold War (ZEGART, 1999), or as a reflection of the complexity and transnationality 
inherent to this political violence phenomenon (MARAS, 2014). Consequently, they also struggle 
to find the most suited strategies to counter this menace. From the industrialized centers to the 
emergent areas of the globe, the aforementioned endeavor has mobilized national governments 
towards the common goal of eradicating terror.  
Even though their objectives are essentially the same, however, there is no consolidated, 
standard procedure for fighting terrorism. This problematic is not restricted to the formulation of 
security strategies per se; it is present on the numerous attempts of defining what terrorism is in 
the first place (BRANT; LASMAR, 2004; MOGHADAM, 2006; HABERFELD, 2009; SCHMID, 
2011; MARAS, 2014). Considering the many different ways to conceptualize terrorism in the 
political arena, it follows that just as many different approaches to counter this menace exist 
(CRENSHAW; LAFREE, 2017). Moreover – and, perhaps, even more importantly –, no decision-
maker adopts or orders the preparation of these strategies in isolation of contextual elements 
(INGLEHART; WELZEL, 2005; SANDERS, 2006). As a result, it is necessary to expect even 
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further variations when it comes to analyzing these cases by taking into account singularities in 
history, culture, behavior, institutions, or international influences. 
Nevertheless, can Political Science understand a States’ response to terrorism? Echoing 
Neal’s (2012) viewpoint, I presume that security issues, such as those that pertain to terrorist 
threats, can be understood from the perspective of politics. I adopt the assumption that this 
understanding can be further enabled by the selection of national defense and security institutions 
as the main objects of research in regards to this subject11. Finally, I attempt to refine this 
comprehension by looking specifically into agencies and other components that constitute national 
intelligence systems. Thus, governmental action, translated into security and defense public 
policies of intelligence, which envision the integrity of a State’s territory and population, being 
thereafter institutionalized within a political system, is the focus of the following sections.  
The objective of this article is to describe the institutionalization of counterterrorism 
intelligence in the United States and France. With this goal, it aims at understanding the main 
differences and similarities between the two cases and, with this, elucidate how these countries 
designed and reformed intelligence institutions in the context of the Global War on Terror 
according to the perspective of historical neo-institutionalism. This study largely bases itself on 
the opinions of experts in regards to this subject, as well as in primary documental evidences for 
its descriptive portions. 
The article, therefore, contains three parts. A brief discussion on the possible contributions 
of the historical neo-institutionalist theory of Political Science for the comprehension of 
institutionalization succeeds this introduction. Next are the cases of the United States and France, 
each with its own section dedicated to it. Finally, I draw my concluding thoughts in regards to 
what this study highlights in its entirety. 
 
Historical neo-institutionalism and institutionalization 
 Political Science has struggled to structure itself as a disciplinary field over the last 
decades. As most areas of knowledge, it saw the rise and fall of different paradigms, each with its 
own maxims and general assumptions. At the epicenter of the successive discussions among 
                                                 
11 I list national security institutions as explanatory variables in contrast to the notion that “normal” politics (NEAL, 
2012), macro-political structures (HELLMUTH, 2016) or the inherently complex nature of terrorism itself 
(CRENSHAW; LAFREE, 2017) ultimately define counterterrorist activities in national governments. 
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political scientists was the controversy around settling what theorists, scholars, and civil servants 
could consider as the actual explanatory variable for political phenomena. One of the principal 
conceptual elements considered for this position were institutions. From the contractualist era to 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, those who would later be called “ancient” institutionalist 
theorists affirmed that institutions, as laws formally coded as constitutional bodies, were the sole 
objects of study in Political Science. They saw that understanding politics meant understanding 
the State and its constituent parts (PERES, 2008).  
The subsequent behaviorist school of thought did not agree with such propositions. It 
argued that, in simple terms, as much as institutions were important elements in politics, they were 
a product of human behavior, which would ultimately shape and define institutional elements. 
Hence, for these theorists it was counterproductive to focus on the institutional factors in politics 
when the most determinant forces came from the actions of political agents themselves. For them, 
the behavior of agents deserved special attention from political scientists, ensuing the 
comprehension of broader political phenomena (ibidem). 
 Neo-institutionalism surfaced as a movement that contested this notion. Bringing 
institutions once again to a central role, it reaffirms that institutional elements explain political 
behavior, and not the other way around. On this, Immergut (1998, p.6) states that “new 
institutionalists vehemently reject observed behavior as the basic datum of political analysis; they 
do not believe that behavior is a sufficient basis for explaining ‘all of the phenomena of 
government’. For behavior occurs in the context of institutions and can only be so understood”. 
As a result, laws, rules and procedures, conventions, organizational structures, among other objects 
of study regarded as political institutions, came to be the explanatory variables of Political Science 
once more. According to these scientists, in order to comprehend the individual actions of political 
actors, one must firstly comprehend how these institutions function and engender collective 
decisions (IMMERGUT, 1998; PERES, 2008).  
 It is worth highlighting, however, that neo-institutionalism is not a unified school of 
thought. Quite on the contrary, as demonstrated by Hall and Taylor (1996), there are different 
approaches to the nature of institutions within this body of theory. They diverge, essentially, in 
regards to the origin of institutions, or the manner in which institutions shape human interactions 
in politics. Among these distinctive approaches is historical neo-institutionalism. According to 
Sanders (2006), this branch of neo-institutionalism highlights the importance of contextual 
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elements. It assumes that rule structures – human creations themselves – provide specific contexts 
whose analysis is adequate for the comprehension of political interactions. Also according to the 
author, there is the relevance of time for these analytical purposes. Institutions are not seen by a 
static perspective, but rather as part of a historic process. Consequently, the creation or the reform 
of institutions are “path dependent” – i.e., decisions and processes located in the past condition 
decisions and processes located in the present.  
 From path dependency, it is logical to conclude that not all institutions are necessarily the 
result of decisions fully embedded with rationality or consciousness. Conditioning to past 
decisions implies that there are constraints to political actors’ rational calculations within 
institutional processes. The context on which these actors are inserted shapes interpretations and 
perceptions of the reality that surrounds them. As Steinmo (apud IMMERGUT, 1998, p.21) puts 
it, institutions “provide the context in which individuals interpret their self-interest and thereby 
define their policy preferences […] and any rational actor will behave differently in different 
institutional contexts”. Stone Sweet, Sandholtz and Fligstein (2001, p.9) reaffirm this when they 
state that “institutions are human artifacts; people make them. At the same time, institutions 
constitute community, shaping how individuals see themselves in relation to others, and providing 
a foundation for purposive action”.   
Thus, it is possible to notice that creating or modifying institutions can sometimes produce 
unintended consequences, or even “perverse results”. Accordingly, political institutions may not 
actually generate the results its creators aspired. Regarding historical contingency, Immergut 
(1998, p. 23) says, “rather than following a logical and efficient trajectory, history is marked by 
accidents of timing and circumstance. These may leave lasting legacies, but such legacies are 
equally vulnerable to unexpected change”. Moreover, but not less importantly, it is noteworthy 
that institutions can assure their own existence from the moment they are created, once they are 
able to shape political actors’ interpretations and perceptions about institutions themselves 
(ZEGART, 1999). 
 There is also the notion that the State is not neutral. Historical neo-institutionalism assumes 
that institutions distribute power unevenly to different social groups, resulting in substantial 
asymmetries. With influences from neo-Marxism and structural-functionalism, it views politics as 
a game of winners and losers, on which groups articulate themselves around determinate ideas 
(SANDERS, 2006). Considering the asymmetrical distribution of power, groups and the interests 
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they represent have different access levels to a government’s decision-making stage (HALL; 
TAYLOR, 1996; TRUE et. al., 2007). Hence, depending on the position an actor occupies within 
an unequal political system, he or she will be constrained or enabled by institutions, being able or 
unable to generate subsequent institutional changes. Institutions are therefore a reflex of a system’s 
distribution of power. 
 It follows that all of these intricacies can have a direct influence over institutionalization 
itself. For the purposes of this article, I define institutionalization as a process on which 
governmental action is, within a timeframe, consolidated into a formal or informal institution. 
Hereby I refer to it not only as the process of creating institutions, but also changing them through 
reforms. As so, it is a process that is dutifully inserted in a specific historical context, thus being 
path dependent. By the limitations imposed over it, it may have unintended consequences. It occurs 
within uneven systems, on which, according to ongoing hierarchies, only a handful of actors are 
capable of influencing its course. It may even end up reproducing these same systematic 
inequalities and, additionally, assure its continuity over time by shaping political actors’ 
interpretations and perceptions to its end. 
 In his study on the institutionalization of joint anti-terrorist policies in the European Union, 
Argomaniz (2010) too utilizes historical neo-institutionalism as a framework for his research 
endeavor. He affirms that this theory is appropriate to his ends to the extent that it “has the merit 
of delineating the origins and developments of institutional structures and its processes, as well as 
its implicit emphasis on ‘developing sequences, the timing of events, and the phases of political 
change’” (ibidem, p.126). These, as evidenced by the aforementioned paragraphs, are essentially 
the identical motives that led to the selection of historical neo-institutionalism as this article’s 
theoretical basis. For the objectives here presented, an historical perspective of institutionalization 
renders it possible to locate this process as part of an ongoing process and further understand it as 
part of a larger contextual environment12. 
 Aside from the workings of institutionalization itself, it is just as relevant to point out what 
can be the causes of institutional change in the views of neo-institutionalists. Also according to 
Argomaniz (2010), this school of thought postulates that two types of factors can bring forth these 
                                                 
12 This is essentially the same motive for not selecting alternative neo-institutionalist approaches, such as rational 
choice neo-institutionalism, as this study’s theoretical basis. The rationalist approach attempts to understand 
institutions in isolation of historical contexts, being a result of fully rational and strategic decisions, which is precisely 
incompatible with the findings presented along this research. 
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changes. The first, exogenous factors, partake to destabilizing occurrences from outside the 
political space. As a response, political actors attempt to formulate and adapt institutions to deal 
with a new reality that presents itself before them. The second, endogenous factors, are changes 
that surface from within the political space. Political actors perceive institutional limitations for 
the attainment of their individual or coalition goals. In just about the same logic, they subsequently 
employ political manipulation tactics in order to generate institutional changes for their benefit.  
In this article’s view, however, these distinctions are blurred. As one can attest, both of 
these approaches essentially involve the mobilization of actors and resources around an idea of 
creating or adapting institutions for a particular objective. On the one hand, political systems 
essentially internalize exogenous factors. There, political agents will endogenously act to generate 
change. On the other hand, endogenous change does not originate spontaneously from political 
elites – especially when it comes to matters of security. They are a reflection from external factors 
– e.g., threat perceptions, societal demands, corporate and bureaucratic lobbyism, and so on. With 
this in mind, they will not constitute rigid classifications for sources of institutional change in this 
study. 
On this matter, Hall (2010) affirms that historical neo-institutionalism has a number of 
contributions to institutional change studies, rendering realistic and analytically manageable 
models. Among them, he cites the role of “instrumental beliefs13” for understanding one of the 
main reasons for the absence of change. Although uncertainty plays an important role in this 
matter, these beliefs are a crucial element for coalition mobilizations involved in institutional 
reforms. Moreover, “common sources for such beliefs include communities of relevant experts 
and prior experience, whether domestic or foreign. Experience (as compared to theory) is 
especially important to the level of confidence actors place in such beliefs” (ibidem, p.208). He 
also emphasizes how existing organizational structures themselves condition the pace and 
direction of change, interplaying with other factors such as distributive issues, identities and 
existing institutional practices. 
Lastly, the author brings up how historical neo-institutionalism’s alternative approach to 
institutions, on a sociological leaning, can enhance the comprehension on change. He asserts that 
                                                 
13 These are described as “means-end schemas that describe in this instance how the adoption of new institutions will 
affect the likelihood of achieving various types of goals, as well as on the level of confidence with which such beliefs 
can be held” (HALL, 2010, p.208). 
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this perspective does not view institutions as rigid set of rules. Instead, they are ambiguous: sets 
of norms whose substructures are subjected to interpretation and reinterpretation. This implies that 
“institutional change can occur through disaggregated processes of ‘reinterpretation’ whereby the 
meanings actors associate with a particular institution change over time, generating correspondent 
shifts in patterns of action” (ibidem, p.216-217). In this sense, “historical institutionalists are more 
inclined to view institutions as objects of active reinterpretation, and often of overt contention, as 
actors seeking power or resources take advantage of their contradictory potential” (ibidem, p.217). 
On this matter, Zegart’s (1999) theoretical framework on security institutions’ resistance 
to change in the United States has its valid contributions, but also a few shortcomings. She argues 
that three factors influence the direction and pace of institutional change, each in a stronger way 
than the other does. The first pertains to an institution’s constitutional moments – i.e., its initial 
design, as the result of conflicts and compromises among political actors. The second are the 
preferences of actors that subsequently pressure for institutional change. The last are external 
shocks, as in significant domestic or foreign occurrences, that push for institutions to adapt 
themselves to new scenarios.  
While Zegart rightly emphasizes the importance of institutions’ constitutional moments as 
a strong indicative for the direction and pace of future change – or the absence of it –, her most 
problematic assumption is ultimately the hierarchy she establishes for the factors that influence 
change. To determine whether external shocks are more often less influential than initial design, 
for example, it would be necessary to employ some type of comparative research effort, something 
that the author does not do in her writings. Considering the absence of corroboration for this 
hypothetical hierarchy, this article does not apply her general formulations for the cases it presents, 
and neither does it universalize her propositions. 
 
The case of American intelligence 
 Background 
 Even though transnational terror – most notably, Islamic extremist terror – has been the 
core subject of present counterterrorism endeavors in the United States ever since the September 
11, 2001, attacks, it is necessary to highlight that, before and after this occurrence, the country has 
struggled against varied forms of terror. With more intensity from the 1950s up until the 1990s, 
US security forces dealt with terrorist acts with political or ideological motivations that ranged 
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from ideas of white supremacism to left-wing extremism, as elaborated by Maras (2014). The most 
notable of these took place in Oklahoma City, in 1995, when right-wing extremists detonated a 
truck bomb in front of a federal building, resulting in 168 casualties – by far the deadliest terrorist 
attack in the country up until that point. From the 1980s onwards, Islamic extremist terror per se 
started to target US citizens, albeit on foreign territories. In 1983, two attacks in Lebanon, one 
against the US Embassy in Beirut and another against US Marines barracks in the Lebanese capital, 
killed more than 250 Americans. Also notably, in 1988 the bombing of the Pan Am 103 flight over 
Lockerbie, Scotland, victimized all passengers on board of the aircraft, including almost two 
hundred US citizens.  
 Two were the government’s most notable institutional responses to the rising threat of 
terrorism then. The first came in 1986, with the establishment of the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s14 (CIA) Counterterrorism Center (CTC). The CTC was designed to centralize efforts of 
intelligence collection and analysis from all agencies that participated in the struggle against 
terrorism, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation15 (FBI). In practice, however, the center did 
not end up consolidating interagency cooperation. Instead, it facilitated intra-agency cooperation 
within the CIA itself, bringing the traditionally separated Directorate of Operations16 (DO) and 
Directorate of Intelligence (DI) staff – operations officers and analysts, respectively – closer 
together. The second response was more than a decade later, in 1999, when the FBI moved to 
create its stand-alone Counterterrorism Division (CTD) and put into practice a more pro-active 
stance against terrorism, as laid out in the same year’s MAXCAP 05 strategic plan.  
 According to Coll (2004), this signaled a different posture from the US government in 
relation to terror under Ronald Reagan’s tenure. If, beforehand, government action was based on 
a more defensive mentality, subsequent American counterterrorism intelligence would be more 
proactive in its exercise, as laid out in the 1986 National Security Decision Directive 207 (NSD-
207). Largely from the confines of the CIA’s DO, the US took increasingly more aggressive 
measures to destabilize terrorist organizations, whether by means of infiltration, sedition, or other 
forms of covert action. At the same time, perhaps paradoxically, US involvement with violent non-
                                                 
14 Responding to the executive, the CIA is mainly tasked with producing intelligence analysis on overseas 
developments. 
15 Under the Department of Justice, the FBI is a judicial police force tasked with the conduction of both intelligence 
and law enforcement activities. 
16 Now renamed National Clandestine Service (NCS). 
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state actors became more frequent as well. Not uncommonly would the CIA provide logistical, 
monetary, and military support to groups that employed terrorist tactics against common enemies. 
This was the case of the US support to the mujahideens in Afghanistan – among those Osama bin 
Laden, who would later become al-Qaeda’s leader – against communist occupation in the 1980s. 
Nonetheless, the 1990s brought transnational terrorism to American soil. In 1993, a 
terrorist with ties to al-Qaeda devised a plan to detonate a truck bomb in the World Trade Center. 
Even though the plan was thwarted by technical failures – which still managed to victimize six 
people –, Schmitt (2010) elucidates that this was the first time on which an international terrorist 
organization orchestrated a massive attack against civilians within the United States. Following 
these events, al-Qaeda resumed the targeting of US individuals abroad. In 1998, there were the 
coordinated attacks to US embassies in Africa – one against the embassy in Dar es Salaam, in 
Tanzania, and the other against the embassy in Nairobi, in Kenya. The almost simultaneous truck 
bomb explosions resulted in the deaths of more than two hundred people, most of them Tanzanian 
or Kenyan. A few years later, in 2000, the American Navy destroyer USS Cole, anchored in the 
port of Aden, in Yemen, for refuel, was hit by a blast coming from a fiberglass boat ridden with 
explosives. Upon its detonation against the hull of the vessel by the terrorists that planted them, 
seventeen US sailors were killed. 
As a reaction to these occurrences, in 1994 the National Congress approved a legislation 
that enlarged the legal definitions of terror by making the provision of material support to terrorism 
equally as punishable as an act of terrorism itself. The law, reinforced in 1996, also broadened the 
FBI’s authority to conduct electronic surveillance. Regardless, the conduction of counterterrorism 
intelligence activities in the United States was still largely constrained by previous legislation 
developed from the 1960s onwards in response to several episodes of abuse of power by the 
government. The specific issue of unrestricted domestic surveillance against US nationals by 
intelligence services, most importantly, resulted in the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA). From that moment, FISA established that, in order to monitor domestic security threats, it 
was necessary for intelligence and law enforcement services to present, before an independent 
court, a compilation of convincing evidences that indicated that a certain target was indeed an 
agent associated to a foreign power or a terrorist group. 
FISA, along with the 1975 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the 1977 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), guaranteed that a robust 
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congressional oversight was at place when it came to the conduction of intelligence activities in 
US soil. It is the interpretation of determinate authors, such as Schmitt (2010), that legislative 
supervision, particularly after FISA, deepened the separation between intelligence and law 
enforcement activities in the US. The author illustrates this argument by mentioning how, on one 
hand, law enforcement investigations would normally take place in regular instead of FISA courts, 
especially because of procedural affinities, while, on the other hand, intelligence services would 
be reluctant to take their investigations to court for fear of disclosing sensitive information to 
defense lawyers. 
The author continued by stating how the division was reflected on the relation between the 
CIA and the FBI, “with the agency’s habit of sharing intelligence on a strict need-to-know basis 
reinforcing its […] view that the FBI was a law enforcement agency, whose principal goal was 
successful criminal prosecutions” (ibidem, p. 86). He finalizes by arguing that this finally resonates 
on the increasing division between foreign affairs, for the CIA to handle, and domestic affairs, for 
the FBI. Other authors, such as Zegart (1999), recognize the law enforcement and intelligence 
divide, but do not necessarily attribute its existence to congressional oversight. Either way, the 
consensual lamentation in regards to this division when it comes to the minimal standards of 
unification against the threat posed by terrorism almost unanimously pointed to the same solution, 
which was that of institutional centralization. 
In this interim, attempts at centralizing national intelligence were not recent in the country. 
Ever since the end of World War II, key political figures in the US government have tried to 
institutionalize the coordination of intelligence activities in the country. This was evidenced as far 
back as in 1947, with the creation of the CIA under the National Security Act – the same piece of 
legislation that established the National Security Council (NSC) and the Department of Defense 
(DoD). Even before the CIA, there was the creation of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 
role, in 1946. After the National Security Act, the DCI would have the double incumbency of 
simultaneously heading both the CIA and the broader United States Intelligence Community 
(USIC). 
What came to be known and consolidated during the Cold War as the USIC is a “group of 
Executive branch agencies and organizations that work separately and together to engage in 
intelligence activities that are necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of 
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the national security of the United States17” (UNITED STATES, 2011, p. 7). The community, as 
a formal concept, does not have an exact moment of creation, but ever since the appointment of 
the first DCI and the aforementioned act, the coordination among all US intelligence components 
– from the CIA, the FBI, and other civil intelligence services to military intelligence services – 
had fallen under the responsibility of this directive role. 
Competition instead of cooperation, however, remained the general rule in the 
counterterrorism field. Regarding counterterrorism endeavors within the US government up until 
2001, Crenshaw (2001, p. 329) explained that American policy is not a straightforward response 
to terror, “but instead a reflection of the domestic political process. Perceptions of the threat of 
terrorism and determination and implementation of policy [occurred] in the context of a policy 
debate involving government institutions, the media, interest groups, and the elite and mass 
publics”. She elaborated that American political institutions were organized in a manner that 
rendered conflict inevitable for the process of agenda setting, which took place in the form of 
public debates. As such, “decision makers with different identities and preferences define and 
represent problems, or frame issues, in order to gain public support for their positions” (ibidem, p. 
330). 
Within the executive branch, there was a wide distribution of incumbencies related to the 
national counterterrorism effort, wherein no clear lines of jurisdiction were set. Blurred limitations 
and overlapping functions resulted in confusion among agencies as to which institution would 
assume which determinate portions of the counterterrorist enterprise. Parochialism and 
competition issued, all within an arena where agencies would only want to tackle problems that 
head clear and efficient solutions associated to them18. Adding more layers of complexity, 
congressional politics also influenced counterterrorism policy processes by being an extension of 
                                                 
17 Today, the USIC, plus the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and its intelligence centers, is composed 
of sixteen agencies and organizations: the Central Intelligence Agency; the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National 
Security Branch; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency; the National 
Reconnaissance Office; the National Security Agency; the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Office of National 
Security Intelligence; the Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; the Department of 
Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis; the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research; the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis; the Army’s Army Military 
Intelligence; the Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence; the Air Force’s Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance; the Marine Corps’ Marine Corps Intelligence Activity; and the Coast Guard’s Coast Guard 
Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Enterprise. 
18 Crenshaw’s (2010) viewpoint in this matter is in accordance with the “garbage can” model of public policy, on 
which a set of given solutions, through the action of policy-makers, would attempt to find problems correspondent to 
them (COHEN et al, 1972). 
40 
 
the battles that happened within the executive, but principally by considering how Congress was 
able to halt executive decisions or choose its own priorities within this realm. Finally, aside from 
actors within the government, it was moreover necessary to consider the influence exerted by the 
media itself, as a channel of communications between and among the public and the elites, and by 
interest groups and community of experts located outside the government. 
Crenshaw (2001, p. 335) summarized all of the aforementioned – quite prophetically – at 
the time: 
“Terrorist attacks, especially spectacular incidents causing large numbers of casualties or 
targeting important national symbols, will contribute to putting the issue on the national 
policy agenda. […] Policy will be developed within a general framework of diffusion of 
power. Multiple actors, inside and outside government, will compete to set the agenda and 
to determine policy through public debate, conducted largely in the news media. Each 
actor, whether an executive branch agency, Congress, or an interest group, wants to forge 
a national consensus behind its particular preference. Due to pressures from Congress, the 
president will not be able to set the agenda for counterterrorism policy with as much 
freedom as he can in other policy areas […]. Implementation of policy decisions will also 
be affected by controversy, due to rivalries among agencies with operational 
responsibilities. Thus it will be difficult for any administration to develop a consistent 
policy based on an objective appraisal of the threat of terrorism to American national 
interests”. 
 
 9/11 and the efforts towards centralization 
On September 11, 2001, the United States was victim to the deadliest terrorist attack in 
history, when terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda hijacked four civilian aircrafts and crashed them 
against the two towers of the World Trade Center, in New York, and the Pentagon federal building, 
in Virginia. The fourth aircraft never hit its intended target – the White House or the Capitol –, 
crashing onto an open field in Pennsylvania instead. In total, near three thousand people died as a 
direct result of the attacks, injuring more than six thousand others. Eight days later, President 
George W. Bush, summoning all US resources and allies, declared the Global War on Terror 
against al-Qaeda and all forms of terrorism at home and abroad. 
Later in October of the same year, the US government enacted the 2001 Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, or simply, Patriot Act. Aside from aggravating penalties against 
individuals charged with the crime of terrorism, and enlarging the definitions of what constitutes 
the latter, in the spirit of an emergency regime, the Patriot Act provoked important changes in 
relation to government surveillance activities, modifying provisions previously established by 
FISA. If, by one hand, the Patriot Act wanted to bring FISA into the twenty-first century by 
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clarifying necessary provisions for the conduction of electronic surveillance in the Digital Age, 
the legislation also made sure to loosen many of FISA’s stringent clauses for data collection of 
hostile targets, facilitating intelligence and law-enforcement counterterrorist activities, albeit at the 
expense of proper oversight. 
The Patriot Act, moreover, consolidated the FBI’s National Security Letters (NSL). As 
explained by Schmitt (2010), through the largely controversial NSLs, the FBI could formally 
request business and transactional information from entities in the private and public sectors. Thus, 
the FBI had the legal authority to demand, for example, that organizations – such as 
telecommunications companies, banks, and credit card operators – voluntarily hand over data 
regarding individuals that were not necessarily under consolidated investigations. The government 
at the time justified the necessity of the exceptional NSLs as an important tool to generate leads, 
build up on existing cases, and produce valuable intelligence products. 
Regarded as a colossal intelligence failure, the events of 9/11 prompted a series of 
investigations into to what could have possibly gone awry in regards to the USIC’s inability in 
anticipating and preventing the attacks. In 2002, Congress proposed the creation of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, or simply the 9/11 Commission. The 
investigative commission, once approved, would conduct a series of hearings with key members 
of government, including heads of the USIC components, the DCI, and other officials, drafting its 
conclusions subsequently. According to Allen’s (2013) extensive records on the process, the 
executive stalwartly opposed such initiative. It argued that this endeavor would be redundant, as it 
would overlap with the work of other investigations already underway, such as the Congress-led 
Joint Inquiry and the executive-ordered Snowcraft Report19. Nonetheless, by the end of 2002, with 
strong lobbyist support20, Congress approved the creation of the 9/11 Commission, which would 
publish its findings two years later. 
Still enjoying the momentum after the catastrophe of 9/11 and spearheading the motto of 
national counterterrorism as a priority, the government enacted, in 2002, the Homeland Security 
Act. Constituting the largest organizational shuffle in US national security apparatus ever since 
                                                 
19 Both investigative efforts would essentially point out to the same conclusions of the 9/11 Commission, principally 
in regards to the perceived need of USIC’s centralization under an empowered directorate – as the DCI was unable to 
effectively exert its leadership position – and the creation of intelligence fusion centers for integration and analysis of 
key USIC missions, such as counterterrorism. 
20 Namely the pressure applied by the 9/11 Families, an adamant lobbyist group formed mostly by widows of 9/11 
victims.  
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the 1947 National Security Act, the legislation consolidated twenty-two national security agencies 
– including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Transport Security Agency 
(TSA), the Border Patrol, Customs, and the Coast Guard – into one agency: the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS). According to the legislation, the DHS would count with its own 
intelligence analysis unit, called Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP). 
Helmuth (2016, p. 46) stresses that the IAIP – aside from its role of protecting critical 
infrastructure, developing plans to securing them, disseminating information, and issuing warnings 
on terrorist attacks – would act as a fusion center. The unit would receive and analyze information 
from law enforcement and intelligence components, and the private sector, and then integrate such 
data, identifying possible threats to the homeland. 
Merely one month later, in 2003, the government issued the creation of the Terrorism 
Threat Integration Center (TTIC) under DCI’s authority. Assembling members of the CIA, the 
FBI, the DHS, and the DoD, the TTIC was responsible for merging and analyzing all terrorist 
threat information into a single facility. As a result, the center would produce daily all-source 
terrorist threat assessments for the presidency. While these assessments differentiated the TTIC 
from the IAIP, according to Helmuth (2016), critics saw that the new intelligence center’s overall 
functions would essentially double or overlap those tasked to the DHS’ intelligence unit. Meant to 
be the President’s core fusion center regarding terrorist threats, the IAIP was now sidetracked by 
the existence of the newly created TTIC, which, by Zegart’s (2007) regard, further hampered the 
inclusion of the DHS into the USIC. Government responses to these perceptions emphasized that 
“the DHS is solely responsible for information related to domestic counterterrorism, while the 
TTIC’s terrorism analytic mission is global in nature” (HELMUTH, 2016, p. 49). 
Later in 2003, came the creation of the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). This new 
center, complimentary to the TTIC, would compile a single, all-encompassing database of terrorist 
suspects. Similar to the TTIC, it would unite members of different agencies of the USIC. The 
creation of the TSC was meant to solve the dilemma of the multitude of terrorist watchlists that 
existed across intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Most of these watchlists – twelve, in 
total, ran by nine different agencies – were inaccessible among members of the USIC, hampering 
information sharing between them. By Helmuth’s (2016, p. 50) account, the TSC “would 
consolidate data from these twelve separate ‘watch lists’ and for the first time make the data 
available across agency lines, allowing more efficient and comprehensive background checks”. At 
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the same time, the FBI amplified its presence across the United States with the establishment of 
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTFFs) on all fifty states. All the same, this, along with states’ own 
initiatives to create their local and regional counterterrorism fusion centers – more than sixty by 
2007 –, further contributed to put into question IAIP’s declared mission of vertical information 
integration. 
By July 2004, the 9/11 Commission published its findings on an extensive, intricate report, 
available for public consumption. While the report spoke of national intelligence as a whole, a 
substantial portion of it was dedicated to the matter of counterterrorism intelligence and the 
developments of al-Qaeda’s activities. Titled as the 9/11 Commission Report, it contained a 
profound recounting of the events that led to the 2001 attacks. A solid descriptive and analytical 
work brought together occurrences and decisions related to the tragedy, pointing out to government 
successes and, most poignantly, failures at home and abroad. On its final portion, the report issued 
a series of recommendations aimed at improving the overall effectiveness of US national 
intelligence, namely through initiatives of deep institutional reform. 
Chapter 11 of the report (2004, p. 339-360) enumerated four types of failure: in 
imagination, policy, capabilities, and management. By failures of imagination, the 9/11 
Commission pointed out to the fact that no agency was able to appreciate the nature of the threat 
posed by al-Qaeda. It understood that the explanation for this lied on the fact that a full assessment 
of the terrorist scheme was impossible at the time. This was inherently paradoxical due to the 
finding that all information regarding to the 9/11 plot was indeed at the hands of USIC components. 
The problem was its diffusion across several different agencies, those of which did not share 
whatever data they had in their possession with each other. Hence, the lack of a complete picture 
of what was underway made analytical work insufficient at detecting grave terrorist threats to the 
homeland, something that, in its turn, did not result in proper anticipatory action. According to the 
Commission, the solution lied in institutionalizing imagination by making bureaucracy work as a 
whole. 
Failures in policy referred not to the inappropriateness of government action towards al-
Qaeda, but to the absence of it. Strongly related to the aforementioned failure in imagination, the 
Commission argued that the US government, unaware of what actually constituted the peril posed 
by the terrorist group, failed at implementing any sort of political action that resulted into the 
group’s deterrence or elimination. In part, this is attributed to the role played by the country at the 
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end of the Cold War in the international system. With the fall of the communist superpower, the 
United States, with its newly acquired role of prevailing power, directed its attention to a series of 
destabilizing developments around the globe at the time, such as the conflicts in Serbia and Iraq. 
As a result, little of its efforts were aimed at combating a threat that was barely understood by its 
information services. 
The Commission elaborated that the failures in capabilities were the result of security 
institutions’ functional inadequacy to face contemporary terror. Echoing Zegart’s (1999) 
comprehensive explanation, at the turn of the century, US intelligence agencies were not directed 
at tackling a diffuse, transnational threat such as terrorism. Instead, they were stuck at the context 
of the Cold War, when they were first conceived. Institutional resistance to change made it so that 
American intelligence, previously directed at the Soviet bloc, was inherently deployed to acquire 
and act upon information regarding state targets, even when the context on which in it was inserted 
had dramatically changed. Accommodation made it so that the government did not replace the 
strategy existent prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall by a different doctrine, which addressed a more 
complex reality21.  
Lastly, management failures included both operational and strategic aspects. Considering 
the scope of the threat, it was imperative that cooperation existed between agencies tasked with 
different portions of the complete counterterrorist endeavor. The rigid institutional barriers 
between USIC components, however, made it unpractical to plan and launch domestic and 
international joint operations between the services. Strategically, the role of the DCI did not 
possess sufficient authority to direct the agencies subordinated to it into cooperative efforts of 
collection, analysis, dissemination, and prevention. Neither did it compel the directive position 
itself to attain and formulate a comprehensive plan of action for a national counterterrorism effort 
by means of joint, cooperative action of USIC members. In order to be effective against terror, the 
community needed a leader that could cross and eliminate bureaucratic divides, a task that the DCI 
was simply not capacitated to perform. 
                                                 
21 Furthermore, the Commission made sure to enumerate the insufficiencies of homeland security agencies’ resources 
for prevention against terror, such as in the DHS and the FBI. Finally, the report called upon the apparent lack of 
enthusiasm by the CIA and the DoD for the exercise of counterterrorist covert action – secret government action 
conducted by intelligence services, beyond collection and analysis –, which, for the most part, resulted in mere data 
collection instead of neutralization. 
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In all, the report could largely summarize its critics to US intelligence in its failure to 
“connect the dots”, i.e., the absence of information sharing due to conscious or unconscious 
barriers between national security institutions. Regarding this, the Commission (2004, p. 353) 
declared, in short, that: 
“Information was not shared, sometimes inadvertently or because of legal 
misunderstandings. Analysis was not pooled. Effective operations were not launched. 
Often the handoffs of information were lost across the divide separating foreign and 
domestic agencies of the government […]. However the specific problems are labeled, we 
believe they are symptoms of the government’s inability to adapt how it manages problems 
to the new challenges of the twenty-first century”. 
 
 Among the report’s several recommendations for US intelligence, detailed on chapter 13, 
two proposals related to centralization are particularly relevant to the coordination of future 
counterterrorism efforts: the establishment of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) role and 
the creation of national intelligence centers subordinated to this authority – most notably the 
creation of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The national intelligence centers would 
have the incumbency of carrying out missions related to a specific subject, such as 
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and counterproliferation. They would be designated as 
“fusion centers” in the sense that, assembling a staff composed by officials from different agencies 
in the USIC, they would then centralize intelligence analytical efforts into a single institutional 
framework, acting upon their assessments accordingly.  
Regarding the DNI proposal, the commission reiterated foremost that the DCI’s former 
responsibilities were inadequate to the position’s managerial reach and to the expectations vested 
on it: 
“The DCI now has at least three jobs. He is expected to run a particular agency, the CIA. 
He is expected to manage the loose confederation of agencies that is the intelligence 
community. He is expected to be the analyst in chief for the government, sifting evidence 
and directly briefing the President as his principal intelligence adviser. No recent DCI has 
been able to do all three effectively. Usually what loses out is management of the 
intelligence community, a difficult task even in the best case because the DCI’s current 
authorities are weak. With so much to do, the DCI often has not used even the authority he 
has” (ibidem, p. 409). 
 
 Hence, this new directive position would firstly separate these three “jobs”. The head of 
the CIA would only be tasked with leading his or her agency, while the DNI, responding to the 
presidency, would have two main areas of responsibility: overseeing national intelligence centers 
on specific subjects of interest across the U.S. government, and managing the national intelligence 
program and overseeing the agencies that contribute to it. Regarding the first area, in the 
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Commission’s viewpoint, the management of intelligence centers on major issues served the 
purpose of allowing joint operational planning across the USIC based on the centers’ assessments. 
This implied the authority to direct operations, no matter to whom USIC components were 
subordinated. As for the second area, the Commission believed that it was necessary for the USIC’s 
overseer to be able to allocate funds and prioritize missions within his or her community, following 
the NSC’s guidelines. Accordingly, the commission assumed enlarged budgetary authority for the 
DNI22. 
 The publication of the 9/11 Commission Report was immediately followed by an intense 
political process, on which the guidelines for an intelligence institutional reform were discussed 
and negotiated with Congress, the presidency, bureaucracies, interest groups, and with the mass 
media’s participation. The result, after a series of concessions, was the eventual promulgation of 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) in December 2004, an act whose 
substance was significantly downplayed in relation to the Commission’s recommendations, as 
extensively described by Zegart (2007) and Allen (2013). It is worth noting that the most adamant 
opposition to the act’s objectives of centralization came from the DoD, which saw the act as threat 
against its firm control over the agencies formally subordinated to it, such as the National Security 
Agency (NSA). Still, IRTPA’s results were far from unremarkable in terms of institutional 
reorganization of the USIC. 
 The act made official the role of the DNI, acting as head of the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI). As the statuary leader of the USIC from that moment, the DNI is 
the main responsible for ensuring the effectiveness of American intelligence by promoting 
information sharing, transparency, and cooperation. Nevertheless, the authority it was given did 
not correspond to the Commission’s expectations. For once, IRTPA did not attribute to the DNI 
the capability to appoint or dismiss officials in the community. Neither did it confer significant 
powers over the budget for national intelligence, meaning no effective control over resource 
allocation was in effect. Consequently, as much as the consolidation of the DNI was a step further 
                                                 
22 It is also appropriate to highlight the report’s recommendations partaking to the issue of the divide between law 
enforcement and intelligence in the country. The 9/11 Commission believed this could be at least partially remedied 
by means of reforming the FBI. According to it, “a specialized and integrated national security workforce should be 
established at the FBI [that is] recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of an institutional 
culture imbued with a deep expertise in intelligence and national security” (NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE 
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 2004, p. 425-426). This later contributed to the 
consolidation of the FBI’s National Security Branch (NSB). 
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from the former competence of the DCI in managing the USIC, it still lacked important traits in 
order to exercise its expected role of centralizing intelligence and its missions. 
 Subordinated to the ODNI are the national intelligence centers, namely the aforementioned 
NCTC, which replaced the TTIC. As a fusion center, the NCTC was institutionalized as a 
centralizing organism for counterterrorism matters within the USIC. Its functions include unified 
threat analysis, management of the Threat Identity Datamart Environment (TIDE) – the 
government’s “central classified repository for all known or suspected international terrorists and 
their networks” (NCTC, 2017, p. 6) –, and coordination of counterterrorism efforts across the 
USIC. Additionally, according to IRTPA, the NCTC is responsible for strategic operational 
planning for counterterrorism. According to Best Jr. (2011) and Allen (2013), however, the loosely 
defined role of strategic operational planner, in contrast to the Commission’s envisioned role of an 
effective operational planner for the national centers, stripped the NCTC of any actual authority 
over the national counterterrorism enterprise and its operational missions, giving it a vague 
directive role instead. 
 In 2005, a new investigative commission was assembled in Congress. The National 
Commission on Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD), or WMD Commission, was tasked with elucidating the intelligence failures 
that were responsible – at least partially, if politicization is taken into account – for the wrongful 
assessment of Saddam Hussein’s possession of weapons of mass destruction, which resulted in the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. Similarly to the 9/11 Commission, it produced a report containing post-
morten analyses and recommendations. As the WMD Report took place after the events of IRTPA, 
it also assessed the progress of the ongoing intelligence reform.  
Unsurprisingly, its contents echoed many of the 9/11 Commission’s conclusions. It added, 
nonetheless, that the DNI’s new competences were unsatisfactory for the ambitious objective of 
coordinating intelligence, as were the national centers’ competences for directing national 
missions, such as counterterrorism, in an effective fashion. To remedy such shortcomings, the 
Commission suggested the establishment of Mission Managers. According to the Report (2005, p. 
316) these managers, serving under the ODNI, would “be responsible for designing and 
implementing a coordinated effort”. Enjoying the existing institutional framework post-IRTPA, 
the Mission Managers would be the heads of the national intelligence centers on their respective 
missions. As such, following this recommendation, the NCTC’s director became dual-hatted as 
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head of the center and the Office of National Intelligence Management for Counterterrorism 
(ONIM-CT) as well. 
Preparedness for an ongoing threat 
 Ever since the enactment of the Patriot Act in 2001 and the modifications to FISA 
procedures that came along with it, the American government has stood at a crossroad. At one 
hand, liberal leaderships in Congress and vocal activists have urged that the United States re-
normalize itself, returning to its pre-9/11 conditions and straying away from a police state. At the 
other hand, cautious actors in the Executive, conservative legislative actors, and resented citizens 
have demanded that security stay a priority, even if certain liberties must be sacrificed for the 
greater good of the country. This tug-of-war was present on the several Patriot Reauthorization 
Acts and FISA Amendments Acts that followed the first emergency legislations.  
For the most part, as Helmuth (2016) describes, exceptional measures remained either 
authorized by revalidation of the acts or formally codified into normal law. Concurrently, however, 
legislators guaranteed that at least some supervision was attributed to government surveillance 
activities. With the Patriot Act’s expiration in mid-2015, came the Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-collection and Online 
Monitoring (USA FREEDOM) Act, or simply, Freedom Act. While limiting much of the data-
collection provisions allowed by the previous act, the Freedom Act extended some of the Patriot 
Act’s sections up until 2019, such as the one partaking to the surveillance of lone-wolf terrorists 
in the country. 
 Even though the United States has not been victim of any major attacks perpetrated by 
actors directly linked to terrorist organizations since the events of 2001, lone-wolf terrorism has 
remained a persistent threat to the country on the years that followed 9/11, posing a complex 
challenge to the American security apparatus. In recent times, terrorists inspired by Al-Qaeda 
extremist ideology, and later on by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) propaganda, have 
acted alone to conduct violent attacks across US territory. Such was the case of the 2002 LAX 
shooting, the 2009 Little Rock shooting, the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, the 2013 Boston Marathon 
bombing, the 2015 San Bernardino attack, the 2016 Orlando LGBT nightclub attack, and the 2017 
New York City truck attack, all of which have caused more than a hundred casualties. In most, if 
not all, of these events, the online presence of terrorist groups represented a major factor on 
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propelling individuals to act on their behalf, adding yet another layer of intricacy for the 
consideration of intelligence services. 
 Seemingly, as noted by Schmitt (2010), there has been an improvement in counterterrorism 
information sharing across the USIC after IRTPA’s promulgation, especially on vertical 
information sharing from federal to local entities by means of the fusion centers and JTTFs. 
However, connecting the dots requires effective data collection, and the author points out hurdles 
related to this task in both the CIA and the FBI. Namely, he mentions that the CIA’s recent 
strategies on countering Islamic extremist terror suggest that the agency is employing Cold War-
era strategies of infiltration, which would represent a problem since “terrorists who exist outside 
the traditional state-centric system are not readily targetable by traditional CIA recruitment 
methods and practices” (ibidem, p. 100). At the same time, he notes that the FBI has resisted 
significant transformations in its priorities and operational techniques, conserving its federal 
investigative case-oriented approach to terrorism prevention instead. 
 In terms of intelligence analysis post-IRTPA, Best Jr. (2011) points out shortcomings 
within the cadre of the NCTC. In regards to the NCTC’s diversified staff, he explains how there 
remains the issue of clashing bureaucratic cultures among intelligence officials coming from 
different agencies, particularly in relation to the traditional friction between law-enforcement and 
intelligence officials working together. He also elucidates how many of these officials retain 
significant loyalty to their parent agencies, choosing to bring the most valuable information on 
terrorist threats to entities outside the center instead of analyzing them within the NCTC’s 
facilitates – a phenomenon particularly common with CIA officials that remain loyal to the 
agency’s CTC. This contributes to implications that the NCTC does not possess sufficient 
institutional authority to exert dominance over USIC components that were supposed to coordinate 
their counterterrorism efforts by means of the center’s leadership in the first place – an assumption 
that brings the NCTC’s role of terrorism prevention into question. 
 
The case of French intelligence 
 Background 
The French struggle against terrorism is not recent – a fact that is illustrated by the very 
coinage of the term “terrorism”, commonly attributed to Robespierre’s Reign of Terror on the late 
eighteenth century France. During recent decades, France’s government and population dealt with 
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what Gregory (2003) nominates “trois cercles de terrorisme”: intrastate violence motivated by 
regional identity or ideology, anti-colonial violence against French rule, and transnational 
terrorism. Shapiro and Suzan (2003) similarly corroborate a threefold categorization of terrorism 
in France. These authors, notwithstanding, offer different categories, or circles: radical left-wing 
terrorism, regional separatist terrorism, and international terrorism. Here, they offer a perspective 
on which they incorporate anti-colonial struggles into the logic of international terrorism while 
separating identity-oriented acts of terror from ideology-motivated political violence. 
 For either classification, there is a chronological observation regarding the last category of 
international or transnational terrorism. The type of terrorism that France has dealt with in its past 
and present has essentially shifted throughout the decades from political violence that surfaced 
from groups within its own borders to attacks perpetrated by transnationally organized terrorist 
cells. Mainly during the course of the 1970s and onwards, separatist groups from the regions of 
Brittany, Basque Country, and Corsica conducted several attacks against French authorities, 
resulting in hundreds of casualties, especially by the hands of the Front de Libération National de 
la Corse (FLNC). This was roughly the same period when Action Directe (AD) started its 
activities, an anti-capitalist group closely linked to other far-left groups across Europe, which 
targeted members of industry, banking, and government. Gregory (2003) also brings up liberation 
struggles within the French DOM-TOMs23, resulting from a second wave of anti-colonialist 
movements, following those that took place right after the Second World War. He mentions the 
violent occurrences in Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyana, and New Caledonia as terrorist activities 
against French rule24. 
 Concurrently to the developments of these incidences of terrorism, starting notably from 
the 1980s, French security forces witnessed a significant internationalization of terror. From this 
moment, no longer were the aims of terrorist groups confined to the immediate cessation of French 
domination over part of its legal territory. France turned into a stage for acts of violence that did 
not necessarily target the French government or its closest affiliates, nor that envisioned the end 
of a specific institutional ruling. Instead, it became involved in violent developments related to 
                                                 
23 Départements et territoires d’outre-mer, French territories located outside the European continent, with varying 
levels of autonomy. 
24 At this point, it is not clear why the author classifies these uprisings as acts of terror – building upon the existing 
debate surrounding the differentiation between legitimate liberation movements and illegitimate doings of terrorism 
(MARAS, 2014) – while leaving out other decolonization events against French domination that likewise took place 
in the twentieth century. 
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either larger, considerably more complex inter-regional issues, such as liberation pan-Arabic 
struggles in the Middle East, or with conflicts that had no direct relation to France at all, such as 
Armenian separatism.   
According to Gregory (2003, p. 129), “in part this reflects colonial history which has 
brought diaspora communities to French cities and made France a haven for exiled leaderships 
ousted, often temporarily, by events in their own countries”. Shapiro and Suzan (2003, p. 69) add 
that this was permitted due to France’s “sanctuary doctrine”, on which the French government 
deliberately “attempted to isolate the country from international terrorism by creating within 
France a sanctuary both for and from international terrorists”. With this, “international terrorist 
groups would have nothing to fear and nothing to achieve in France” (ibidem). Thus, as much as 
this posture initially benefited France for its pragmatic stance away from controversial 
international issues and for its refusal to invest heavily in repressive measures against non-state 
actors scheming within its territory, the sanctuary doctrine eventually turned against those who 
idealized it. 
With freedom to act inside French borders, terrorist organizations established solid 
networks within the country, which, in their turn, could rapidly mobilize and engage whenever 
authorities contradicted their interests. This became especially problematic during the mid-1980s, 
as French foreign interests evolved to directly clash with regional players’ ambitions in the Middle 
East. Responses came in the form of proxy political violence: state-sponsors of terrorism, such as 
Libya, Syria, and Iran, issued orders for terrorist cells within France to act with the purpose of 
discouraging French interventionism in the region. This situation eventually culminated into the 
waves of attacks perpetrated in the streets of Paris by the Palestinian-Lebanese Comité de 
Solidarité avec les Prisonniers Politiques Arabes et du Proche-Orient (CSPPA) in 1986, on which 
the group detonated twelve explosive devices across the city in less than eight months, generating 
a public outcry for more security. 
One of the earliest and most remarkable forms of recognition by the French government 
regarding the absence of institutional coordination and centralization on the struggle against 
terrorism within intelligence services came with the establishment of the Unité de Coordination 
de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste (UCLAT) within the Ministry of the Interior in 1984. It sought to 
remedy two perceived flaws in counterterrorism. The first shortcoming was that no single entity 
in France was responsible combating the specific threat of terrorism, as no government agency 
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was specialized on this subject. Each attempted to conduct counterterrorist activities according 
their respective directives, with almost no information-share between them. The second 
shortcoming, directly related to the first, was that these entities came to have overlapping 
responsibilities, causing further friction among them. As a result, analytical, preventive, and 
coercive efforts were spread out across different government bodies, with none of them actively 
possessing a full perspective on the issue at hand. 
In this context, the French government did not decide to create the UCLAT aiming to 
delegate all counterterrorist activities to this organization, but rather to establish a coordinating 
body that would assure the unified cooperation of existing security services for a national 
counterterrorism mission. According to Poinas (apud GREGORY, 2003, p. 135), UCLAT’s 
mission has been threefold: intelligence gathering and analysis, prevention of terrorist acts, and 
suppression of terrorist activity. As Shapiro and Suzan (2003, p. 76-77) put it, “the purpose of [this 
organization has been] to make connections between all the various intelligence and police services 
with the French government bearing on the question of terrorism”. Thus, on the realm of 
intelligence, the UCLAT had the task of dealing with friction between the Direction Générale de 
la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE)25, the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST)26, and the 
Direction Centrale des Renseignements Généraux (DCRG)27 – and, additionally, the Direction du 
Renseignement Militaire (DRM) and the Direction de la Protection et de la Sécurité de la Défense 
(DPSD)28, to a lesser extent.   
Regarding this, and corroborating Chopin’s (2017, p. 12) vision that French intelligence 
“has long resembled a divided house – or a field of full unorganized battling tribes”, Bonelli (2008, 
our translation) illustrates part of the challenge associated with UCLAT’s incumbency when 
speaking of convergences and divergences within French antiterrorist services: 
“Antiterrorism is [..] a stake of struggles, on which contradictory representative systems 
and different ambitions clash. Intelligence services are, exceptionally, nothing short of a 
state within a state, nonetheless never a simple tool at service of political decision. They 
                                                 
25 Part of the Ministry of Defense, the DGSE is mainly tasked with conducting foreign intelligence, acting near 
exclusively outside of French borders against external threats. 
26 Formerly part of the Ministry of the Interior, the DST was mainly tasked with conducting domestic intelligence, 
acting within French borders. Its Division Nationale Anti-Terroriste (DNAT) was primarily responsible for detecting 
threats on a domestic level that originated from foreign state or non-state actors. 
27 Formerly part of the Ministry of the Interior, the DCRG was also tasked with conducting domestic intelligence, but, 
distinctively from the DST, it focused its activities on threats that originated from French territory itself. Hence, not 
uncommonly were the activities of the DCRG under public scrutiny for their frequent surveillance of French nationals. 
28 Both branches of military intelligence services. 
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value their own interests and analyses, all in an effort of consolidating their credit along 
political elites, by means of pertinent information production for the latter.29”  
 
Equally important as the UCLAT was the legislation passed in September 9, 1986 by the 
French government, notable in response to waves of terrorist attacks in the previous years. The loi 
relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme et aux atteintes à la sûreté de l’État defined the notion of 
terrorism and its procedural consequences. It centralized judicial processes partaking to acts of 
terror in the fourteenth section of the Paris prosecution service (Parquet), with the establishment 
of a professionalized cabinet composed of investigating magistrates (juges d’instruction) 
(BONELLI, 2008; FRANCE, 2016). Deviating from the traditional Anglo-Saxon system of 
justice, these judges were charged with conducting impartial investigations of crimes related to 
terror themselves, evaluating whether prosecution should be taken forward or not. Their enlarged 
investigative powers allowed their activities to become similar to those undertook by intelligence 
services, while also ensuring their unique specialization on cases of terror within the judicial sphere 
(SHAPIRO; SUZAN, 2003).  
Faced with the continuity and aggravation of transnational terror, French authorities made 
sure to adapt consistently the 1986 law in order to enlarge its repressive powers, constituting what 
Bonelli (2008) considers the vertebral column of French antiterrorist legislation. The 1995 and 
1996 laws, for instance, broadened the minimum standards for terrorism investigation by 
categorizing the conspiracy to commit acts of terror as terrorism itself (SHAPIRO; SUZAN, 2003). 
Subsequent laws further authorized police forces to aggressively conduct investigations and 
preemptive actions against suspects of terrorism, as in the 1991, 1992, 1995, 1996 and 1997 laws 
(FRANCE, 2016). Therefore, by conferring due legitimacy to increasingly anticipatory police 
work against terror at the expense of civil liberties, the French government consolidated a doctrine 
of “preventive judiciary neutralization”, as characterized by Bonelli (2008). 
Garapon (2005) affirms that this distinctive setting, as opposed to the American logic of a 
military response to terror, constituted France’s judicial option against terrorism. He continued 
(ibidem, p. 3) by stating that France had to have an adequate interface between intelligence 
agencies and the judiciary:   
                                                 
29 In the original: « L’antiterrorisme est [...] un enjeu de luttes, dans lesquelles s’affrontent des systèmes de 
représentation et des ambitions différents, voire contradictoires. Les services de renseignement ne sont 
qu’exceptionnellement un État dans l’État, mais jamais un simple outil au service de la décision politique. Ils font 
valoir des intérêts et des analyses propres, tout en s’efforçant de consolider leur crédit auprès des élites politiques, 
par la production d’informations pertinentes pour ces dernières. »  
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“The principal condition for the success of the judicial option is to ensure that the interface 
between intelligence and justice, which requires adequate communication in both 
directions, provides a solid judicial relay for intelligence work and, in the opposite 
direction, ensures the appropriate analysis of information gleaned from judicial 
proceedings.” 
 
In this sense, the exchange of information between the judicial and the intelligence spheres 
were mostly conducted by the aforementioned institutionalized structures of the UCLAT and the 
Parquet. Nonetheless, the DST occupied a rather central role in this endeavor. For its cumulative 
functions attained ever since its creation in 1944, the DST was the only agency that accumulated 
the double mandate of an intelligence and a judiciary police service, which conferred an ideal 
configuration of continuous linkage between these two types of work within the French security 
apparatus (GARAPON, 2005; BONELLI, 2008). 
Accordingly, there has been a sense of complementarity of intelligence and judicial 
activities in France. By one side, the investigating magistrates obtained with intelligence services 
the advantage of continuous surveillance and panoramic, long-term analysis of terrorist threats, as 
opposed to the rigid case-by-case approach of law enforcement investigations. Remarkably, 
intelligence activities function by a logic of anticipation that traditional judiciary work lacks, 
something that is especially useful when investigating cases of terror (SHAPIRO; SUZAN, 2003; 
GARAPON, 2005). Simultaneously, at the other hand, intelligence services benefited from the 
Parquet’s authoritative powers of granting legitimacy for increasingly allowing intelligence 
officers “to move relative seamlessly from collecting intelligence to taking part in judicially 
authorized investigation”, as stated by Schmitt (2010, p. 36). 
All this constitutes what Garapon (2005, p. 2) calls not a “French model”, but a “French 
advantage” against terrorism, a result – by a historical perspective – of France’s relatively early 
experiences with transnational terror. Shapiro and Suzan (2003, p. 88) agree by saying that 
“France’s experience with the threat of internal subversion has long allowed and even demanded 
the existence of powerful domestic intelligence agencies”. This culminated in a “formidable state 
apparatus against terrorism both within French territory and outside it”, as Gregory (2003, p. 134) 
puts it. In his turn, he continues by attributing this perceived success to aspects of French society. 
He highlights that the key to this positive outcome “is a citizenship which often readily accepts the 
compromise of individual liberty for the collective good and a political context in which a degree 
of vigor by the forces of the state is widely, though of course not universally, seen as a necessary 
price for continued security and order” (ibidem). 
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Towards centralization and normalization 
Contrary to the experiences of most Western liberal democracies, the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
on US soil did not engender major structural changes to the French security apparatus on the 
immediate years that followed it. Considering all adaptations made to French intelligence and 
overall security capabilities ever since the 1980s, France’s national intelligence service was at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, as Hayez (2010, p. 475) describes it, “in a rather good 
shape”. All the same, the attacks most surely provided contextual elements for some institutional 
modifications, especially in conjunction with the Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005, 
respectively (SCHMITT, 2010). But it was not until the year of 2008, when President Nicolas 
Sarkozy announced the directives for institutional change in French intelligence with the 
publication of the same year’s Livre Blanc sur la Défense et la Sécurité National (White Paper on 
Defense and National Security), that France would actively modify certain aspects of its approach 
to countering terrorism. 
Notwithstanding, some changes after 9/11 and before that occurrence were noteworthy, 
namely the establishment of 22 regional permanent task forces for combating terrorism, in 2004, 
and the creation of advisory posts tasked with interagency coordination among security services, 
whether under presidential or parliamentary authority, as enumerated by Hellmuth (2015). In 2002, 
the Executive installed the Conseil de Securité Intérieure (CSI), for coordinating all ministerial 
leaderships associated with national security activities related to combating crime and terrorism at 
the domestic level. Critics saw this act as a move for presidential centralization of security efforts, 
moving away from congressional oversight. A demonstration of this stance was the referral of the 
head of the CSI at the time as an Elysée czar, Monsieur Sécurité, or a super-préfet.  
Shortly afterwards, in 2004, a permanent counterterrorism cell was installed within the 
ranks of the DGSE for the interagency coordinated work of agents from the DGSE, the DST, and 
the DCRG. Its resemblance to UCLAT was quickly noticed and denounced, to which the cell’s 
activities were justified as being operational in their nature, versus UCLAT’s administrative 
functions of information sharing assurance and threat analysis integration. Even so, this apparent 
duplication of the UCLAT was viewed with suspicion, as the presidency would retain more control 
over activities that traditionally fell under the Ministry of the Interior’s authority, i.e. the 
Parliament’s responsibility. 
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On the same year, the Legislative moved towards its own efforts of centralization with the 
creation of the Conseil du Renseignement Intérieur (CRI). Responding to the prime minister, this 
advisory post counted with the participation of members of the DST, the DCRG, the judicial police 
and the gendarmerie. Once again, critics pointed out its resemblance with UCLAT. The 
government responded that this was not a case of institutional duplication for the reason that the 
UCLAT was foremost a permanent forum, to which the CRI would formulate strategic guidelines 
for information sharing and cooperation. 
Subsequently, nonetheless, the presidency reorganized both the CSI and the CRI in 2007. 
A fusion of the CSI with its defense counterpart, the Conseil de Défense, resulted in the Conseil 
the Défense et de Sécurité Nationale (CDSN). Under presidential authority, the CDSN was 
essentially created to break the foreign-domestic divide in security30 by emulating the United 
States’ National Security Council. On a cross-institutional impetus, it attained the responsibility 
for France’s homeland security, public safety, and international and defense issues. The CRI, in 
its turn, was renamed as the Conseil National du Renseignement (CNR), now acting as a 
specialized formation of the CDSN and, accordingly, responding to the president as well. With the 
CNR, came the creation of the role of Coordenateur National du Renseignement, resonating the 
American DNI. 
The CNR and its coordinator were tasked with “coordinating intelligence services, in 
particular with regard to developing intelligence strategies and collection and analysis priorities, 
implementation, and sharing; allocating resources; and overseeing the legal framework for 
intelligence operation” (ibidem, p. 984). In other words, and more specifically, it also came to be 
responsible for deciding annual investment plans for intelligence (HAYEZ, 2010). Once again, 
these rearrangements came to be considered as political maneuvers for presidential concentration 
of power, straying even farther away from parliamentary scrutiny of intelligence activities. 
Forcade (2013) does not share this viewpoint, bringing up the congressional delegation for 
intelligence activities formed in 2007, the Délégation Parlementaire au Renseignement (DPR), to 
corroborate his position that the Executive’s actions were not without proper oversight under the 
rule of law. He calls for the fact that France has indeed lagged behind other European country on 
                                                 
30 The divide between foreign and domestic intelligence is commonly debated in Intelligence Studies as one of the 
most notable barriers for the establishment of an optimal information-sharing environment, as seen on the American 
case and explored by 9/11 Commission (2004). 
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matters of congressional oversight of intelligence, but mentions how 2007 would soon represent a 
historical turn for the consolidation of accountability principles in French intelligence. 
Finally, in 2008, the publication of the White Paper happened within the context of a 
constitutional reform in France. This reform, as constitutionalists viewed, had been implemented 
by the government with the intent of providing more power and autonomy to the presidency of 
France, especially concerning security affairs. Chopin (2017), in disagreement, affirms that the 
reform accentuated the powers of both the Parliament and the presidency, while trying to frame 
the conduction of overt and covert state activities under the standard rule of law. As such, the 
constitutional reform greatly influenced the direction of the intelligence reform in France. 
Simultaneously, the reshaping of French intelligence came to be an ideal illustration of the 
constitutional reform’s general sense of normalization.  
This remounts to what the author calls the specificity of the French state, i.e. the conduction 
of any state action under the doctrine of Raison d’État. Historically, as he explains, this principle, 
on the one hand, could be interpreted as “the state transcending every other kind of political reality 
and moreover any other kind of authority, and as such being able to declare when necessity makes 
law” (ibidem, p. 4). On the other, it could mean “the idea of legitimate but temporary exceptional 
measures, which may have to be regulated” (ibidem, p. 4). He continues by affirming that France, 
in opposition to most liberal regimes, traditionally relied on the first understanding, while rejecting 
the second. According to the author: 
“This doctrine is intertwined with the original birth of the modern state in France, and with 
the notion of absolute sovereignty, at the time of the emergence of the so-called 
‘Westphalian system’ […]. At the heart of the original idea of the reason of state in France 
is the unification of the social body under a unified power capable, against all social 
division, and especially against the divisions arising from religious factions, of imposing 
civil peace” (ibidem, p. 3). 
 
Hence, throughout the centuries intelligence activities in France came to be regarded as a 
“regalian” power, an inherent part of the state and its development, which is not subjected to 
oversight due to its uttermost important role of maintaining social cohesion. This goes in direct 
opposition to the liberal “Anglo-Saxon” tradition of regarding the intelligence constant dilemma 
associated with the trade-off between the effectivity of intelligence and the respect to individual 
liberties. While in France these moral predicaments were set aside by the doctrine of the Raison 
d’État, largely unmodified ever since Richelieu’s ministry in the seventeenth century, other liberal 
states passed through numerous transformations on which intelligence activities were put under 
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scrutiny, aiming to guarantee its legitimacy when faced with existential threats. As such, he points 
out that the intelligence reform signaled in 2008 – and in 2013 with the publication of yet another 
White Paper – precisely indicates that France is on the verge of abandoning this specificity towards 
the “liberal model”31 of state, on which there is a functional separation of intelligence from the 
general bureaucracy. 
In this sense, the White Paper confirmed the merge of the DST and the DCRG into the 
Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur (DCRI), later renamed as the Direction Générale 
de la Sécurité Intérieure (DGSI), in 2012. For one aspect, this directive came as significant for its 
clearer delimitation between the incumbencies of general domestic intelligence services – the 
DGSI – and incumbencies of general foreign intelligence services – the DGSE –, subsequently 
allowing their coordination by the aforementioned councils with further ease. Furthermore, it 
resulted in a marked decrease of the controversial surveillance activities formerly conducted in 
national soil by the DCRG, which were then relegated to the Ministry of the Interior’s Service 
Central du Renseignement Territorial (SCRT). 
Nevertheless, one of the main points of this intelligence reform was the consolidation of 
the notion of a Communauté Française du Renseignement (CFR), first officially introduced in the 
2008 White Paper. The community, defined by decree in May 12th, 2014, and made official in June 
24th, 2015, was composed by the six specialized intelligence services – the DGSE, the DGSI, the 
DRM, the DPSD, the DNRED32, and the TRACFIN33 –, the aforementioned coordenateur national 
du renseignement – now in charge of managing the community –, and the Académie du 
Renseignement34.  
As in the United States, one of the main notions of the CFR is centralization. Chopin (2017) 
mentions that this implies two different evolutions. The first is that it “refers to the possibility of 
centralizing decision-making processes in the area of intelligence activities once the services have 
been regrouped within a single community” (ibidem, p. 13). This would also encompass 
                                                 
31 Here I choose to paraphrase Chopin’s (2017, p. 1) footnote on this choice of words, which clarifies that “we use 
here the notion of ‘liberal state’ with care, and not in a normative or theological sense that there would be an ‘Anglo-
American’ way of defining politics and the polity that would be objectively ‘normal’ and a ‘model’”. 
32 The Direction Nationale du Renseignement et des Enquêtes Douanières is the French intelligence service that acts 
against any customs fraud. 
33 The Service de Traitement du Renseignement et d’Action contre les Circuits Financiers Clandestins is the French 
intelligence service that acts against financial crimes, from money laundering to terrorism financing. 
34 The Académie was created in 2010, with the mission of conceiving, organizing, and implementing initial and 
continuous formation of intelligence personnel, favoring the cooperation between services in matters of formation, 
and participating in initiatives of public awareness towards intelligence (FRANCE, 2014). 
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parliamentary institutions. Under the authority of the prime minister, the Secrétariat Général de 
la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale (SGDSN) was formerly tasked with the establishment of 
the Plan National du Renseignement (PNR), a national directive plan for intelligence collection 
and analysis. With the creation of the CFR, the government attributed to the community the 
responsibility of establishing a national strategy for intelligence, formalized as the PNR. In this 
configuration, it was decided that the CFR would impulse the PNR, while the SGDSN would 
implement it. The second evolution would be that all decisions partaking to domestic and foreign 
security would only be taken forward if they went through this new institutional formation located 
at the center of the French government. 
Aside from centralization, there is also the important notion of normalization that came 
with the reform. The 2008 White Paper made sure to officially state, unprecedentedly, the 
provision of a legal basis for the conduction of intelligence activities, under parliamentary 
approval. Accordingly, it indicated that “a statutory definition of the missions of the intelligence 
services will be given by the law” (apud HAYEZ, 2010, p. 481), which later came to be 
consolidated by a bill approved by the government, in July 2015. The White Paper confirmed 
mechanisms of oversight, namely the aforementioned DPR and two other parliamentary regulating 
authorities: the 1991 Commission Nationale de Contrôle des Interceptions de Securité, for the 
monitoring of domestic communications interceptions, and the 2001 Commission de Vérification 
des Fonds Spéciaux, for the appraisal of extraordinary funds allocated to intelligence services. By 
Chopin’s (2017) viewpoint, normalization further signified that the public and the media are 
increasingly regarding intelligence services as regular government components, demystifying the 
notion of exceptional activities that are out of reach from ordinary citizens. 
Regarding the directions of the intelligence reform up to the establishment of the CFR and 
the challenges ahead, Hayez (2010, p. 484) concludes: 
“Having shed its proverbial complex about these matters, France has newly acquired the 
elementary political framework, already developed and implemented for at least a decade 
in most democracies, for so doing: a statement of intention by the Executive, a coordinating 
machinery, a comprehensively designed architecture for the services, and a parliamentary 
oversight mechanism. It now owns almost all the structures needed for a legitimate and 
efficient intelligence apparatus”. 
 
The 2010s attacks and their aftermath 
For many observers that regarded the French antiterrorist apparatus as an example to be 
followed by fellow Western democracies, the terrorist attacks of the 2010s came as a surprise. 
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Even with the continuity of minor terrorist attacks by radical separatist groups, up until that 
moment, according to Schmitt (2010, p. 47), “the French government [believed] that it [had] 
devised an effective counterterrorist system and that it [was] on top of the problem. If we 
[compared] France with other European states, we [would’ve had] little reasons to doubt that 
claim”. As a result, these attacks prompted a series of new pieces of legislation by the French 
government, which, similarly to the 1990s, sought to update the antiterrorist legislative basis 
established in 1986. The 2012, 2014, and 2016 laws, for example, once again enhanced police and 
intelligence investigative powers and enlarged the definitions of terrorism. 
The first of the attacks came in March 2012. On the occasion, Mohammed Merah, a French 
national of Algerian descent, went on a shooting spree on the cities of Toulouse and Montauban, 
in Southwestern France, targeting Armed Forces soldiers and Jewish citizens. The attacks resulted 
in eight casualties, including that of the shooter, and five non-fatal injuries. As evidence suggests, 
the Merah affair, as it came to be known, was a case of lone-wolf terrorism, considering that 
investigative authorities could not find strong connections between the perpetrator and terrorist 
organizations. Merah’s extremist motivations included his opposition to French involvement in 
the war in Afghanistan, his anti-Semitic stance in reaction to Israeli actions towards Palestinian 
people, and his resentment for the 2010 French ban on face covering.  
In January 2015, two gunmen stormed the headquarters of Parisian satirical newspaper 
Charlie Hebdo. The shootings that followed resulted on the death of twelve people, among the 
newspaper’s staff and others who were present at the time of the attack. The perpetrators, also 
French nationals of Algerian descent, were affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, 
which took responsibility for the the attack, and most likely conducted it in response to Charlie 
Hebdo’s satirical depiction of the prophet Muhammed and Islam as a whole on its previous 
editions. Within the same timeframe of the two-day manhunt after the two gunmen – which 
resulted on their deaths – another terrorist incident took place in Paris. On this occasion, a gunman 
who had pledged allegiance to ISIS, closely related to the Charlie Hebdo attackers, invaded a 
kosher supermarket and held its customers hostages. In the hours that followed, four of the 
hostages were killed, all of them Jewish. 
On November 13 of the same year, another attack took place in the streets of Paris. 
Coordinated suicide bombings and mass shootings perpetrated by nine attackers killed 130 
civilians, while injuring more than four hundred. The attacks happened at the vicinity of the Stade 
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de France, at restaurants and cafés, and at the Bataclan nightclub, where most of the casualties 
took place. Claimed by ISIS, the attacks were a retaliation against the French airstrikes in Syria, 
and were the deadliest terrorist incident in Europe ever since the 2004 Madrid train bombings and 
the single deadliest in French history. On the following months, several other attacks were 
conducted across France, all of them on a significantly smaller scale when compared to the 2015 
incidents, except for the 2016 attack in Nice. On this occurrence, also claimed by ISIS, a terrorist 
from Tunisia rammed a truck against bystanders who were watching a firework display in the 
city’s promenade in commemoration of the Bastille Day. In total, 86 casualties were reported, with 
the injuries of 458 others. 
On the night of the November 13 attacks, President François Hollande declared a three-
month État d’urgence in France. The state of emergency, as explained by Ragazzi (2017), is a 
temporary state on which the Executive is given extraordinary powers to conduct anticipatory 
measures in French territory. On this condition, the presidency confers police forces more freedom 
to act coercively, which, in their turn, can utilize administrative measures, such as house arrests, 
with further ease. Once the president, in consultancy with the Legislative power, installs the state 
of emergency, it must have an expiration date set. The last state of emergency was extended five 
times following the November 2015, attacks: on February 2016, for three months; on May 2016, 
for two months; on July 2016, for six months; on December 2016, for six months; and finally on 
July 2017, for three months. Concerning this prolonged state of exception in France, which 
effectively ended on November 201735, Ragazzi (2017, our translation) points out that: 
The state of emergency, and by extension the fight against terrorism and radicalization, 
[was] severely criticized by human rights and anti-discrimination organizations and by a 
number of important institutional actors. These policies [brought] forward central 
questions regarding the separation of powers, the respect to civil liberties, and the nefarious 
effects of the diffusion of a logic of suspicion among society36. 
 
It is notable that, according to this author, mainly after the Merah affair, there was a 
doctrinal change concerning the definitions of terrorism in France. From that moment, the notion 
                                                 
35 It is necessary to highlight that, with the end of the state of emergency, the French government, under President 
Emmanuel Macron, passed new legislation that effectively incorporated many of the state’s exceptional administrative 
measures into regular state practice. 
36 In the original: « L’état d’urgence, et par extension la lutte contre le terrorisme et la radicalisation, est sévèrement 
critiqué par les organisations de défense des droits de l’homme, de lutte contre les discriminations, et par un nombre 
important d’acteurs institutionnels. Ces politiques posent en effet des questions centrales sur la séparation des 
pouvoirs, le respect des libertés civiles, et sur les effets néfastes de la diffusion dans l’ensemble du corps social d’une 
logique de suspicion. » 
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of radicalization of individuals was not treated as an issue separate from acts of terror, but as an 
important part of it, which had to be tackled. Concurrently to the enlargement of this definition 
was the enlargement of the French counterterrorism mission and, hence, the legitimate actors 
associated with it, which now included members of civil society. Within the Ministry of the Interior 
came the creation, in 2015, of the État-Major Opérationnel de Prévention du Terrorisme 
(EMOPT), which, similarly to the UCLAT, has the mission of coordinating services associated 
with the fight against terror, but with the specific duty of developing an offensive radicalization 
prevention policy (FRANCE, 2017). 
Further institutional developments followed suite. Inaugurated in 2017, the Bureau Central 
du Renseignement Pénitentiaire (BCRP) is an intelligence activities office dedicated to the 
reinforcement of penitentiary security and, with that, the fight against terrorism and organized 
crime. The BCRP is under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior and has become an integral 
part of the CFR. Also in 2017 came the creation of the Centre National du Contre-Terrorisme 
(CNCT), much similar to the American National Counterterrorism Center. Part of the former CNR, 
now renamed Coordination Nationale du Renseignement et de la Lutte contre le Terrorisme 
(CNRLT), the CNCT reinforces the coordination among services, incentives information-sharing, 
reassures compliance to the rule of law, and develops European and international intelligence 
liaison on matters of counterterrorism (CF2R, 2017). Its strong resemblance to the NCTC further 
reflects on the CNCT’s essentially strategic, instead of operational, mission statement, merely 
guiding services on their respective roles. 
 
Concluding thoughts 
 It is difficult to establish a rationale for the institutionalization of counterterrorism 
intelligence for both previous cases. However, it seems possible to adopt Chopin’s (2017) 
nomenclature when analyzing the French case to characterize these processes. As such, 
centralization can refer to an agency or entity’s concentration of administrative power over the 
conduction of intelligence activities aimed at countering terrorism. Normalization, in contrast, can 
signify the adequacy of counterterrorism intelligence activities to the rule of law, ensuring the 
respect of individual civil rights. 
On general lines, it is possible to say the United States have moved towards the 
centralization of intelligence after the perceived failures that led to 9/11, following a great deal of 
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what was recommended by the 9/11 Commission and other investigative commissions. The 
American government saw that reinventing the way that the USIC collects, analyzes, and 
disseminates intelligence could solve the issues of national security vulnerabilities to terrorism, so 
it embarked on an ambitious mission of intelligence reform in search of enhancing the 
community’s ability to “connect the dots”. It is also safe to say that the country has drifted away 
from the process of intelligence normalization that was in progress ever since the Cold War. The 
enactment of the Patriot Act, and the persistence of its provisions for more than fifteen years – 
easily characterized as measures of exception on the context of a liberal democracy –, have put 
into question whether American authorities consider civil liberties to have such a greater 
importance in its trade-off against national security anymore. 
 At the same time, centralization efforts have had innumerous hurdles on their way. Political 
actors in Congress have done everything in their power to downplay or halt legislation that could 
possibly alter traditional configurations of power in the American national security apparatus, as 
in the case of the 2004 IRTPA negotiations. Bureaucracies and its staff have resisted change, even 
with general recognition on the necessity of transformation or with the enactment of acts that order 
them to do so. Additionally, attempts at denouncing and reverting exceptional acts have not been 
negligible in the country. Namely after the 2013 government classified information leaks by 
Edward Snowden, actors in Congress and social society have exerted considerable pressure to 
revert the post-9/11 regime of surveillance back to acceptable levels in terms of civil liberties 
respect. In this sense, the enactment of the USA Freedom Act represented an important step 
towards re-normalization in the country, a process whose next developments remain to be seen. 
 Also on general lines, France has made its own compromises towards centralization. 
Perhaps more importantly, the French government has taken significant measures on the 
normalization process of counterterrorism intelligence activities. Whereas it remains true that 
some centralization was already present in regards to the French counterterrorist endeavor, namely 
with the role played by the UCLAT ever since the 1980s, the publication of the 2008 White Paper, 
within the context of the same year’s constitutional reform, signaled an even further centralization 
of the country’s intelligence apparatus as a whole. As such, the formalization of the CFR came as 
a significant indicator of this renewed strategic mindset. Additionally, the same White Paper was 
symptomatic of the country’s historical turn away from the Raison d’État doctrine in domestic 
security matters and towards the path of normalization. Hence, the unprecedented codification of 
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intelligence activities into normal law and the confirmation of oversight mechanisms demonstrated 
the French willingness to abandon gradually the long-standing state of exception allowed in the 
country by its counterterrorism regime.  
 As in the United States, these advancements did not take place without drawbacks and 
signs of regression. While in the American case the moves for centralization happened for the 
accepted perception that institutionally integrating counterterrorism activities would result in 
effectiveness, it is prudent to question what exactly is the French motivation behind its own 
centralization process. At this point, although it seems reasonable to assume that unifying a 
counterterrorism mission under a single leadership is in fact a good idea for increasing 
effectiveness, it is also necessary to take into consideration what critics point out as the French 
presidency’s recent attempts at concentrating coercive and monitoring powers in its hands in 
detriment of Congress. Also of notice are the successive extensions of the État d’urgence in 
France, and the successive codifications of controversial surveillance and detainment measures 
into normal law. 
 Still, it would be challenging – if not unpractical – to compare both country’s experiences 
with counterterrorism. The contextual elements that render each of them unique are impossible to 
ignore and, therefore, not take into consideration when attempting to operationalize each case in 
search of comparable variables. To illustrate only a few of them, the United States’ engagement 
with counterterrorism is fairly recent. A single catastrophic event was almost the sole compelling 
factor that allowed a comprehensive institutional reform in the country’s intelligence apparatus. 
The French history with transnational terrorism dates to the end of the last century. Its 
counterterrorism mechanisms and practices have matured – and solidified – for decades and are 
only recently undergoing a remarkable transformation, allegedly for the benefit of a newly 
acquired compromise for fostering civil liberties. Whereas the United States struggles to bridge 
the divide between intelligence and law enforcement, a rather functional coordination of both takes 
place in France, notably since its 1986 antiterrorist law, which still constitutes the country’s 
backbone for terrorism prevention. 
 Even under a full presidential system, versus France’s semi-presidential system, it seems 
that American legislative forces are keener on engaging with reformist acts in the realm of 
intelligence, a task largely relegated to the presidency in France. This indicates that the intricacies 
of each countries’ political processes for institutionalization are dramatically different. 
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Internationally, at the same time, both countries have almost equally demonstrated their 
willingness to engage in interventionist missions abroad, namely in the Middle East and Africa – 
resulting in dramatic effects, whether negative or positive, in yet unquantifiable amounts, for both. 
Moreover, French society has been historically permissive of government exceptional security 
measures, while in the United States societal reactions to exceptionality seem more fluctuant in 
relation to momentary perceptions of threat.  
 The absence of objective comparison for these cases of counterterrorism at this point, on 
dimensions such as effectiveness or legitimacy, nonetheless, is not fruitless. Even with such 
conclusions, it is prudent to affirm that Political Science can understand a State’s response to 
terrorism – at least to some extent. As observed in the intricacies of American and French processes 
of counterterrorism institutionalization, it is possible to infer that the lenses provided by historical 
neo-institutionalism are more than adequate to comprehend each case in further depth. 
Asymmetrical distributions of power within states determine much of the conflicts existent 
between components of the American and French counterterrorism apparatuses, as the inherent 
competition for prestige and control among intelligence community members has demonstrated. 
Consolidated security frameworks in the USIC and the pre-CFR have shaped actors’ perceptions 
regarding the role and execution patterns of intelligence activities prior to the Global War on 
Terror, just as the developments of the latter have strongly affected these same perceptions. 
 Historical contingency was undeniably at work when decision-making processes took 
place, evidencing just how their trajectories are not necessarily logical or efficient. Just as the Cold 
War, even after its end in the previous century, ended up determining the functionality of many 
US agencies up until 9/11, the French early experience with terrorism has contributed to the 
country’s decisive approach on countering this issue in the recent decades. Similarly, the American 
responses to abuse of power scandals in the 1960s and the following decades have given the 
country a more mature approach to congressional oversight on intelligence activities than in 
France. All of this has influenced the direction and intensity of institutional change on both cases 
– or, just as importantly, their resistance to change. On the United States, it was clear how 
institutional rigidity became an issue when it came to the necessity of reform. This was quite 
similar to France’s difficulties on its efforts towards normalization versus the well-established 
rationale of the Raison d’État. On both cases, it became evident how external shocks were 
important in order to generate change within their respective political systems. 
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 In a final regard, I argue that the extensive description of the counterterrorism intelligence’s 
institutionalization process in the previous cases can be accepted as the first portion of a broader 
comparative effort between the analyzed countries when it comes to evaluating the dimension of 
counterterrorism effectiveness. For this affirmation, I rely on Crenshaw and LaFree’s (2017) yet 
unexplored proposition that counterterrorism effectiveness can be determined by setting a 
distinction – as conceived by Easton (1965) – between output effectiveness, outcome 
effectiveness, and impact effectiveness in a subsequent application to counterterrorism evaluation. 
As such, the contents of this research fit into what they consider input effectiveness, i.e., “the 
implementation of regulations, policies, and legislation”, measured by “whether a particular 
instrument of policy was actually drafted and passed” (ibidem, p. 193). The following steps of this 
endeavor would thus imply an assessment of outcome effectiveness and impact effectiveness for 
the posterior evaluation of counterterrorism effectiveness as a whole regarding these two specific 
cases. 
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O contraterrorismo, enquanto política pública de importância central para Estados 
industrializados ou em desenvolvimento, carece de instrumentos avaliativos objetivos na academia 
e nos setores público e privado. Segundo a 9/11 Commission (2004, p. 381), as estratégias de 
contraterrorismo nos Estados Unidos, por exemplo, possuem metas descritivas, porém elas não 
possuem objetivos, ou seja, indicadores mensuráveis de sucesso ou falha. Conforme descrito na 
última porção do artigo aqui apresentado, a partir da proposição realizada por Crenshaw e LaFree 
em “Countering Terrorism: No Simple Solutions” (2017), o esforço realizado nesta dissertação 
pode justamente enquadrar-se em um empreendimento sequencial e mais amplo de avaliação de 
estratégias de contraterrorismo. Segundo os autores, baseando-se nos trabalhos de Easton em 
“System Analysis on Political Life” (1965), tal tarefa avaliativa dar-se-ia pela determinação de uma 
dimensão de efetividade do contraterrorismo a partir de uma distinção de três partes deste conceito: 
efetividade de output (output effectiveness), efetividade de resultado (outcome effectiveness) e 
efetividade de impacto (impact effectiveness). 
A efetividade de output “refere-se à implementação de regulações, políticas e legislação”, 
a efetividade de resultado “concerne ao impacto que essas leis e regulações têm sobre o 
comportamento proibido” e a efetividade de impacto “refere-se a quão bem os objetivos de longo-
prazo do [contraterrorismo] são atingidos, especialmente ao reduzir ou parar o comportamento37” 
(CRENSHAW; LAFREE, 2017 p. 193, tradução nossa). Quanto à primeira dimensão, ainda de 
acordo com os autores, a efetividade de output poderia ser mensurada com respeito a se uma 
política foi elaborada e subsequentemente aprovada. Argumenta-se aqui, desta maneira, que a 
análise contida no artigo acima, acerca dos processos de institucionalização do contraterrorismo 
pela atividade de inteligência nos Estados Unidos e na França, contempla justamente a primeira 
dimensão do empreendimento avaliativo proposto por Crenshaw e LaFree (2017). Assim, ao 
descrever como estratégias de combate ao terrorismo foram traduzidas em instituições e políticas 
em ambos países, acabei por realizar a determinação de efetividade de output para ambos os casos, 
permitindo a realização dos passos subsequentes desta proposta de pesquisa.  
É verídico que tentativas prévias de mensuração de efetividade do contraterrorismo foram 
realizadas no passado, como em Byman (2003), LaFree et al. (2009), Schmid e Singh (2009) e 
                                                 
37 No original: output effectiveness refers to the implementation of regulations policies, and legislation. Outcome 
effectiveness concerns the impact that these laws and regulations have on prohibited behavior. Impact effectiveness 
refers to how well the long-term goals of [counterterrorism] are met, especially reducing or stopping behavior.   
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Dugan e Chenoweth (2012). Todavia, conforme Crenshaw e Lafree (2017), estas análises 
produziram resultados insatisfatórios por estabelecerem indicadores demasiadamente amplos, 
gerais ou difíceis de medir. De tal modo, com a realização do primeiro dos três passos propostos 
pelos autores para o estabelecimento de medidas claras e sistêmicas para efetividade, sugere-se 
então o desempenho de esforços de pesquisa direcionados à determinação das duas dimensões 
seguintes: de efetividade de resultado – medida ao verificar se políticas de contraterrorismo 
fizeram o que elas foram designadas a fazer – e de efetividade de impacto – medida em mudanças 
comportamentais a longo-prazo de atores em relação ao terrorismo. Aponta-se ainda que, para a 
delimitação dos objetos deste estudo, o neoinstitucionalismo histórico continuará sendo adequado 
enquanto referencial teórico – ao menos no que concerne à tarefa de determinar-se a efetividade 
de resultado do contraterrorismo. 
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